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ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the majoritarian implications of collective 
bargaining for public employees, focusing in particular on teachers. 
To critics, collective bargaining supplants the ordinary legislative and 
administrative processes for determining public policy such as the 
length of the school day, teacher personnel policies, class size, and 
many other topics. Critics argue that bargaining thus allows teacher 
unions to exert disproportionate control on these issues at the expense 
of the broader public. 
This Article first questions this critique of public sector collective 
bargaining. A robust system of collective bargaining need not 
empower unions to override the preferences of the public. Local 
legislatures must approve and fund labor agreements, and state laws 
have long defined a broad class of topics as “permissive” for 
bargaining, meaning that the parties can bargain on the topics only if 
both consent. Although governments and unions often bargain over 
permissive topics, the designation gives the government wide latitude 
to cease bargaining when mutually beneficial compromise appears 
unlikely, thereby shifting policy questions into the normal political 
process. 
Yet, rather than embracing the permissive designation, bargaining 
critics have promoted rules that prohibit bargaining over many topics. 
Legislators in Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and Idaho have 
recently adopted this approach. But these efforts badly miss the mark. 
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The real question for reformers is not how to limit unions’ 
involvement in policymaking but rather how to ensure that 
government officials use their power to advance the wishes of the 
public. 
In light of this new assessment of public sector bargaining, this 
Article suggests a different approach to bargaining rules. The 
proposal makes broad use of the permissive distinction while 
involving local legislatures more directly in bargaining. The proposal 
is more majoritarian—and more supportive of teachers’ labor rights—
than the bargaining prohibitions currently in vogue. 
INTRODUCTION 
oday, the public school system is often a battleground in which 
education reformers and labor advocates find themselves in 
opposition.1 To be sure, both camps seem to share an understanding 
that American schools are not educating students nearly well enough. 
This problem has been documented most extensively in American 
cities. Of eighth graders in urban schools, approximately three of four 
do not perform at grade level in mathematics, and three of four do not 
perform at grade level in reading.2 In the fifty largest American cities, 
                                                 
1 Recent skirmishes have taken place in Chicago, where teachers went on strike during 
contentious contract negotiations focusing in part on proposed changes to performance 
evaluations, see, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, In Standoff, Latest Sign of Unions Under Siege, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/education/in-chicago    
-teachers-strike-signs-of-unions-under-siege.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; in Idaho, Ohio, 
Tennessee, and Indiana, where legislatures limited collective bargaining for teachers in the 
name of education reform, only to have those limits reversed by referenda in two of the 
four states, see infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text; and in the numerous states that 
have reduced pensions for teachers and other public employees, see Steven Greenhouse, 
States Want More in Pension Contributions, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/business/16pension.html?pagewanted=all. 
2 According to the 2011 National Assessment of Educational Progress, twenty-three 
percent of eighth grade students in large cities were at least proficient in reading and 
twenty-six percent were at least proficient in mathematics. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2012-455, THE NATION’S REPORT CARD: TRIAL 
URBAN DIST. ASSESSMENT READING 2011, at 35 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov 
/nationsreportcard/pdf/dst2011/2012455.pdf; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2012-452, THE NATION’S REPORT CARD: TRIAL URBAN DISTRICT 
ASSESSMENT MATHEMATICS 2011, at 30 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch 
/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2012452. The National Assessment of Education Progess has often 
been called the “gold standard” of American achievement testing. James S. Liebman & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of 
School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 226 
(2003). 
T
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only half of students complete high school.3 And although 
commentators continue to debate the chicken and egg dilemma of 
poverty and ineffective schools,4 it is nevertheless clear that the 
inadequacies of American public education contribute to a wide range 
of social problems. 
The common ground ends, however, when education reformers 
charge that teacher unions are a key part of the problem. Reformers 
note that collective bargaining agreements between school districts 
and teachers (often called “teacher contracts”) govern the operations 
of American public schools in many respects.5 Naturally, in states that 
require collective bargaining for public employees, teacher contracts 
determine salaries, fringe benefits, grievance procedures, and other 
terms central to teachers’ employment. But reformers correctly 
observe that in many cases, contracts go further. For instance, class 
size is a typical subject of bargaining in the twenty-six states that do 
not have state laws that take precedence on the topic.6 Contracts often 
set the length of the school day and year7 and establish seniority-
                                                 
3 CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR., 
CLOSING THE GRADUATION GAP: EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN 
AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES 13–14 (2009). Swanson’s analysis is based on data collected 
by the U.S. Department of Education for the 2004–2005 school year. Id. at 10–11. The 
highest graduation rate among the fifty largest cities was 76.6% in Mesa, Arizona; the 
lowest was 30.5% in Indianapolis, Indiana. Id. at 14. 
4 See, e.g., Richard Whitmire, Op-Ed., Poverty Not All to Blame for Lousy School 
Outcomes, USA TODAY (July 15, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news 
/opinion/forum/story/2012-07-15/poverty-schools-education-fail/56240702/1 (arguing that 
good teaching can overcome, at least in part, the difficulties in educating poor children). 
5 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. HESS & MARTIN R. WEST, A BETTER BARGAIN: 
OVERHAULING TEACHER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2006) 
(“[T]eacher collective bargaining agreements shape nearly everything public schools do.”). 
It is indisputable that teacher contracts often include terms on a wide range of topics 
relevant to many aspects of school operations. Still, there are several reasons to think that 
statements like Hess and West’s are slightly overstated. First, even when teacher contracts 
include terms on a topic, these terms may be sufficiently ambiguous to give district and 
school leaders significant discretion. See Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, 
Scapegoat, Albatross, or What?: The Status Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS 
53, 79–85 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew Rotherham eds., 2006). Second, state law 
sometimes sets policy on topics commonly believed to be determined by teacher contracts, 
such as teacher tenure. EMILY COHEN ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, 
INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: WHY KEY ISSUES ARE NOT ADDRESSED 1 
(2008). Third, several states do not permit school districts to bargain collectively with 
teachers’ unions at all. See infra note 40. 
6 COHEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 9–10. 
7 See, e.g., Hess & Kelly, supra note 5, at 82 (finding that the length of the school day 
was included in collective bargaining agreements in sixteen of twenty randomly selected 
school districts). 
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based systems for the assignment, transfer, and layoff of teachers.8 
Reformers consider each of these topics a key variable in improving 
American public schools, and they persuasively argue that the terms 
embodied in collective bargaining agreements often impede reform.9 
Reformers have therefore claimed that the collective bargaining 
process is an obstacle to improving schools10 and have proposed 
limitations on that process.11 In recent years, those proposals have 
gained support from a broader movement criticizing public sector 
collective bargaining as unduly expensive in a time of budget 
shortfalls.12 The combined efforts of education reformers and fiscal 
hawks have led to several state laws limiting collective bargaining for 
all public employees or for teachers specifically.13 These states have 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., id. (finding that policy on transfers was included in collective bargaining 
agreements in fourteen of twenty randomly selected school districts). For more on 
agreements related to staff deployment, see infra Part IV.B. 
9 See CYNTHIA G. BROWN ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GETTING SMARTER, 
BECOMING FAIRER: A PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AGENDA FOR A STRONGER NATION, at 
viii, 15–16 (2005) (issuing, as the top recommendation for improving American public 
schools, the adoption of a longer school day); Bill Gates, How Teacher Development 
Could Revolutionize Our Schools, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/27/AR2011022702876.html (arguing that class 
size should be increased, with the savings put towards higher teacher salaries); Joel Klein 
& Michelle Rhee, ‘Last In, First Out’ is an Outrage: Firing Less Senior Teachers Hurts 
Schoolkids, N.Y. DAILY NEWS: OPINION (Jan. 26, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/opinion/outrage-firing-senior-teachers-hurts-schoolkids-klein-rhee-article-1.155 
235 (arguing that the selection of teachers laid off should not be based on seniority). 
10 HESS & WEST, supra note 5, at 2 (“[Collective bargaining] agreements are a critical 
part of the problem, and the solution, to the educational challenges we now face.”). It is 
extraordinarily difficult to assess empirically the hypothesis that collective bargaining 
leads to decreased student achievement. See Susan Moore Johnson & Morgaen L. 
Donaldson, The Effects of Collective Bargaining on Teacher Quality, in COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS 111, 112–14, 
138 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew Rotherham eds., 2006) (cataloguing problems with 
ascertaining the effect of collective bargaining on teacher quality and concluding that 
“[n]o consistent evidence shows that the quality of the teaching force has either improved 
or diminished as a result of collective bargaining”); Benjamin A. Lindy, The Impact of 
Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on Student Achievement: Evidence from a New 
Mexico Natural Experiment, 120 YALE L.J. 1130, 1144–49 (2011) (describing statistical 
difficulties in studies on the question). Pioneering a new empirical method, Lindy arrived 
at the confounding conclusion that bargaining leads to an increase in one metric of 
academic achievement, SAT scores, and a decrease in another, graduation rates. Id. at 
1169. 
11 Such proposals specific to teachers were adopted in Tennessee and Indiana. Other 
states enacted similar statutes affecting all state and local government employees. See infra 
Part I.C. 
12 See infra Part I.C. 
13 For example, supporters hailed Wisconsin’s 2011 bargaining law as beneficial for 
both fiscal responsibility and education reform. E.g., Kimberley A. Strassel, Scott 
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acted by, among other approaches, classifying a wide range of topics 
as off limits for collective bargaining between local governments and 
unions. Most prominently, Wisconsin enacted a law that prohibited 
bargaining on all topics other than base wages for most public 
employees,14 while other states enacted somewhat more limited 
measures.15 
Some observers have credibly argued that certain recent efforts to 
restrict bargaining are about “raw power”—that is, crippling unions.16 
But this Article examines criticisms of public sector bargaining, on 
their face, as sincere expressions of concern about the implications of 
allowing policy to be set through bargaining. A range of critics—both 
past and present, in both academia and elsewhere—have claimed that 
public sector collective bargaining, unless limited, is inconsistent with 
majoritarian17 values.18 In critics’ view, bargaining supplants the 
                                                                                                         
Walker’s Education Victory, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052702303753904577452862561051838.html. For a full description 
of recent bargaining restrictions, see infra Section I.C. 
14 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.91(3) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 286). Even with 
respect to base wages, certain wage increases are barred absent authorization through a 
statewide referendum. § 111.91(3)(b) (Westlaw). 
15 See discussion of recent laws in Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, and Idaho infra Part I.C. 
16 James J. Brudney, Ohio Senate Bill 5, and Why We Need Collective Bargaining, 
ACSBLOG (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/ohio-senate-bill-5-and-why-we 
-need-collective-bargaining. Two federal judges have raised questions about the motives 
behind the Wisconsin legislation. Wisc. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 
856, 867 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (“[The Court] cannot wholly discount evidence that the line-
drawing between public safety employees and general employees was influenced (or 
perhaps even dictated) by whether the unions representing these employees supported 
Governor Walker’s gubernatorial campaign.”); Wisc. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, Nos. 
12-1854, 12-2011, & 12-2058, at 43, 73 n.10 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (concluding that Wisconsin’s justifications for portions of its 
collective bargaining bill were “flimsy” and seemingly unconnected from the purported 
goal of cost saving). 
17 This Article adopts the following definition of majoritarianism: a policymaking 
process is majoritarian if it leads to policy consistent with that which would be chosen by a 
referendum of citizens picking between policy alternatives. 
18 See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 
1374 (2009) (“The view that public employee collective bargaining is antidemocratic plays 
a major role in jurisdictions that prohibit such bargaining” and “is not confined to 
opponents of collective representation of public employees.”). For examples of courts and 
scholars who have expressed such concerns, see Fellows v. LaTronica, 377 P.2d 547, 550 
(Colo. 1962) (concluding that public sector collective bargaining threatened to “tak[e] 
away from a municipality its legislative power to control its employees and vest such 
control in an unelected and uncontrolled private organization (a union)”); TERRY M. MOE, 
SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 174–214 
(Brookings Inst. 2011) (arguing that collective bargaining allows teachers unions to force 
inflexible and harmful policies through teacher contracts); William L. Corbett, 
Determining the Scope of Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A New Look Via a 
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ordinary legislative and administrative processes for creating policy, 
replacing those systems with a closed process in which teachers, as 
represented by their unions, have disproportionate influence 
compared to the general public.19 Therefore, critics claim bargaining 
leads to policy outcomes inconsistent with public preferences.20 This 
Article refers to this argument as the “majoritarian critique” of public 
sector collective bargaining. 
This Article questions the majoritarian critique. Even in a robust 
system of bargaining, the government retains the power to ensure that 
preferences of unions do not overwhelm those of the public on 
matters of public policy. Local legislatures must approve and fund 
labor agreements, and state laws have long defined a broad class of 
topics as “permissive” for bargaining, meaning that the parties can 
bargain on the topics only if both consent. Although governments and 
unions often bargain over permissive topics, the designation allows 
the parties to cease bargaining when a mutually beneficial 
compromise appears unlikely, thereby leaving policy questions to be 
resolved in the normal political process. For these reasons and others, 
bargaining prohibitions like those adopted in Wisconsin are deeply 
misguided. But while the bargaining process does not empower 
unions to force their preferences on the public, public sector 
collective bargaining, as it is currently practiced, is susceptible to a 
different criticism—that government negotiators may fail to act as 
faithful agents of the public. To the extent that collective bargaining 
agreements conflict with public preferences, then, the situation is akin 
to an airplane crash attributable to human error rather than system 
defect, a diagnosis that calls for distinct preventative measures. This 
Article concludes that majoritarian aims are best served by a broad 
scope of bargaining in which few topics are prohibited, coupled with 
reforms that encourage local elected officials to play a central role in 
overseeing negotiations. 
This Article analyzes public sector collective bargaining through 
the lens of collective bargaining for one particular group of 
employees: teachers. Public schools provide an ideal case study in 
collective bargaining and majoritarianism because teachers work in a 
                                                                                                         
Balancing Formula, 40 MONT. L. REV. 231, 258–64 (1979) (arguing that public sector 
collective bargaining deprives the public of its ability to participate in policies decisions 
and should be limited). Each of these critiques is discussed in more detail in Part I below. 
19 See, e.g., MOE, supra note 18, at 175–79 (arguing that the collective bargaining 
process is heavily biased towards producing policy favoring union interests). 
20 Id. 
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field laced with intense policy debates, ranging from the proper use of 
standardized testing to curriculum to the role of teacher seniority, 
with nearly every education policy debate affected by collective 
bargaining agreements. Not coincidentally, national teacher unions, 
more than any other American union, face vociferous criticism for 
standing in the way of policy change.21 
Part I provides a historical context for recent criticisms of public 
sector collective bargaining. This Article argues that a common 
intellectual foundation links the earliest criticisms of bargaining, 
starting in early 1900s, to the most recent. Namely, scholars and 
policymakers have long worried that bargaining gives too much 
power to unions to shape policy to their own preferences rather than 
the public’s. In response to these majoritarian concerns, critics have 
long sought to narrow the scope of bargaining by prohibiting 
bargaining over some or all topics. 
In Part II, this Article rebuts this majoritarian critique. This Article 
argues that the structure of the bargaining process does not give 
unions disproportionate power to shape policy, especially in a system 
in which many topics are classified as permissive for bargaining, 
giving the government the ability to cease bargaining on those topics 
when compromise appears unlikely. Meanwhile, bargaining 
prohibitions may only serve to shift policymaking decisions into 
legislative and administrative processes that suffer from all of the 
same flaws that critics attribute to collective bargaining, such as 
special interest group influence and lack of transparency. 
In Part III, this Article argues for a new perspective in analyzing 
public sector bargaining systems, asking not whether bargaining gives 
too much power to unions, but rather whether local government 
officials advance the wishes of the public through their own role in 
bargaining. This Article concludes that school boards may fail to 
closely oversee the bargaining process, giving extensive discretion to 
the government officials directly involved in negotiations. This 
government negotiating team generally consists of school district 
administrators, often led by an appointed superintendent. The 
negotiating team, however, may not have the right incentives or 
dispositions to advance public preferences through collective 
bargaining. 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Joe Klein, Why We’re Failing Our Schools, TIME (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1957470,00.html (“[Teachers’] unions, 
and their minions in the Democratic Party, have been a reactionary force in education 
reform for too long.”). 
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Finally, in Part IV, this Article proposes a reform to the bargaining 
process that, without prohibiting bargaining on any topic, would help 
ensure that government negotiators use their power effectively. The 
proposal would employ a broad scope of bargaining while involving 
local legislatures more directly in bargaining. The broad scope of 
bargaining would allow wide latitude for the parties to make trades 
that serve the preferences of both the public and unions, while local 
legislators would be tasked with publicly deciding whether to 
continue bargaining on each permissive topic. Contrasting this reform 
with prohibitions on bargaining, this Article shows that the proposal 
is preferable from the standpoint of both majoritarianism and 
teachers’ labor rights. The Article concludes with the suggestion that 
education reformers should focus on effective political advocacy for 
change in schools. 
I 
THREE ERAS OF BARGAINING CRITIQUES AND POLICY RESPONSES 
Since public employees first began organizing into unions more 
than one hundred years ago, public sector unionism has been subject 
to serious criticism. Although critics have employed a range of 
arguments against bargaining, these arguments are best understood as 
variations of a single core theme: bargaining distorts public policy by 
allowing the preferences of public employees to outweigh those of the 
broader public. To illuminate the centrality of that theme, this Article 
traces the dominant arguments against bargaining through three 
important eras: (1) the first half of the twentieth century, in which 
teachers and other public employees pushed for basic organizing and 
bargaining rights; (2) the 1960s through 1980s, in which most states 
granted those rights but controversy continued as to the proper scope 
of bargaining; and (3) 2010 to the present, in which states have 
limited collective bargaining for public employees on the grounds that 
bargaining is unjustifiably expensive and inflexible.22 
                                                 
22 The first two eras discussed in this Part correspond to “First Generation” and 
“Second Generation” labor relations as defined in the landmark book on teacher unions 
authored by Charles Kerchner and Douglas Mitchell. CHARLES TAYLOR KERCHNER & 
DOUGLAS E. MITCHELL, THE CHANGING IDEA OF A TEACHERS’ UNION 4–9 (1988). 
Kerchner and Mitchell’s First Generation is characterized by consultation between districts 
and unions without collective bargaining. Id. at 4–7. The Second Generation occurs after 
the initial adoption of collective bargaining for teachers, and typically includes tension 
over the scope of bargaining. Id. at 7–9, 139. 
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A. The First Half of the Twentieth Century: Bargaining as 
Impermissible Delegation 
Government workers engaged in collective labor activity as early 
as 1835,23 and slightly more than seven percent of public workers 
belonged to unions by the 1920s.24 Still, for the first half of the 
twentieth century, state and local public workers had no legally 
protected right to organize—even decades after the National Labor 
Relations Act granted such rights to private employees in 1935.25 In 
opposing public sector unionism, critics argued that unions might be 
more loyal to their unions than to the government,26 and, in particular, 
might cause havoc to their communities through strikes.27 These 
arguments were premised on a perceived contradiction between the 
personal interests of government employees and the interests of the 
public—the proverbial two masters to which no public employee 
could serve. 
That perceived contradiction also underlay a second set of 
arguments, focused not on organizing generally but on bargaining 
specifically.28 Critics charged that bargaining would constitute an 
                                                 
23 JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE 
LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–1962, at 16 (2004) (describing a protest by public workers in 
Philadelphia aimed at limiting the work day to ten hours). Many public employee unions 
negotiated memoranda of understanding with municipalities, though the legal status of 
these agreements was unclear. Id. at 163 (noting that in 1957 the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees reported that 445 of its locals had reached such 
agreements). 
24 SLATER, supra note 23, at 18. This is higher than union density in the private sector 
today. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release: Union Members 
Summary, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2 
.nr0.htm (placing private sector union density at 6.9 percent). 
25 SLATER, supra note 23, at 71. The Lloyd-LaFollete Act, passed in 1912, gave federal 
employees the right to organize. Id. at 19. 
26 Id. at 23, 25, 29. 
27 Professor Joseph Slater has argued that a controversial police strike in Boston in 
1919 was an extremely influential example of the ills of unionization in the public sector 
during this period. Id. at 13–14 (“Unfortunately for public sector unions, the most searing 
and enduring image of their history in the first half of the twentieth century and beyond 
was the Boston police strike. The Boston strike was routinely cited by courts and officials 
through the end of the 1940s.”). Woodrow Wilson called the strike an “intolerable crime 
against civilization.” Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Collective bargaining rights are distinguishable from organizing rights, including the 
risk to strike, because employees can organize into coalitions, such as trade unions, 
without bargaining collectively. For example, the Lloyd-LaFollete Act gave federal 
workers the right to organize in 1912, but the federal government did not bargain with 
employee unions until fifty years later, when President Kennedy signed an Executive 
Order requiring federal agencies to recognize and negotiate with majority unions. See 
generally Wilson R. Hart, The U.S. Civil Service Learns to Live With Executive Order 
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improper delegation of government authority: Policy would be made 
outside the ordinary legislative process and determined largely by 
unions.29 State courts across the country accepted this argument.30 In 
the California case of Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, for example, 
bus operators sued their city employer claiming that the state’s labor 
law compelled the city to engage in collective bargaining.31 The court 
disagreed, holding that the authority to set terms of public 
employment “may not be delegated or surrendered to others.”32 
Although arguments against delegation can be motivated by a 
variety of concerns,33 courts and scholars in this era were worried that 
bargaining would lead public policy to be aligned with the 
preferences of unions rather than the broader public. According to a 
1962 Colorado Supreme Court decision, the consensus among state 
courts was that collective bargaining for public employees was an 
improper delegation because it “would result in taking away from a 
municipality its legislative power to control its employees and vest 
such control in an unelected and uncontrolled private organization (a 
                                                                                                         
10,988: An Interim Appraisal, 17 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 203 (1963–1964) (discussing 
the Order and its immediate consequences). 
29 SLATER, supra note 23, at 75–78. 
30 See id. (detailing state court opinions). The issue was determined by states because 
the federal National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, does not cover state and local 
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (defining “employer” for purposes of the Wagner Act 
to exclude any state or political subdivision of a state). For examples of state cases holding 
that bargaining is an improper delegation, see, for example, Fellows v. LaTronica, 377 
P.2d 547, 550 (Colo. 1962) (“The reasoning of most of the reported cases is that the 
employer-employee relationship in government is a legislative matter which may not be 
delegated.”); Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 168 P.2d 741, 745 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) 
(finding that mandatory bargaining violated nondelegation principles); Springfield v. 
Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Mo. 1947) (rejecting the request of city employees for a 
declaratory judgment that cities could bargain collectively because the determination of 
terms of public employment “cannot be delegated” and “surely cannot be bargained or 
contracted away”). 
31 Nutter, 168 P.2d at 743. 
32 Id. at 745. 
33 To most scholars, the nondelegation doctrine aims to preserve accountability in 
government decisions, though other concerns may also be at stake. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 319–20 (2000) (noting the standard 
accountability justification but arguing that the doctrine also serves the distinct aim of 
promoting the rule of law). The goal of accountability, in turn, may serve as a proxy for 
majoritarianism. See Bernard Manin et al., Elections and Representation, in DEMOCRACY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION 29, 29 (Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (describing 
the view that accountability induces politicians to “choose policies that in their judgment 
will be positively evaluated by citizens at the time of the next election”). But see Sunstein, 
supra, at 319–20 (suggesting that a primary function of the “particular [] form of 
accountability” advanced by the nondelegation doctrine is to guarantee individual liberty 
by “rais[ing] the burdens and costs associated with the enactment of federal law”). 
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union).”34 The court in Nutter, similarly, held that a rule requiring 
bargaining would “discriminate in favor of union labor.”35 The 
following year, a California court made the majoritarian concern even 
more explicit when it indicated that allowing public employees to 
unionize would “defeat the will of the people.”36 Outside of the 
courts, a typical expression of the majoritarian nondelegation 
argument came in a 1928 battle over unionization of teachers in 
Seattle. There, the local chamber of commerce declared that unionism 
could “turn over the education of our children and the direction and 
control of the Seattle public school system” to unions.37 
Over the following decades, state law gradually shifted in favor of 
bargaining by government employees, but majoritarian concerns 
continued. 
B. 1960s to 1980s: Controversy Over the Scope of Bargaining 
Beginning in the 1960s, the majoritarian critique mutated from an 
argument against bargaining broadly to an argument that bargaining 
should be limited so as to avoid encroaching on important issues of 
public policy. In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to grant 
bargaining rights to public employees.38 Soon after, teachers in New 
York City prevailed in a landmark campaign to bargain with their 
school district, led by Albert Shanker.39 Over the next twenty years, 
bargaining for teachers and other public employees became 
widespread, and most states adopted statutes requiring the 
government to bargain over at least some topics.40 But scholars and 
                                                 
34 Fellows, 377 P.2d at 550 (emphasis added). 
35 Nutter, 168 P.2d at 745 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 Perez v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 248 P.2d 537, 545 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947). 
37 SLATER, supra note 23, at 50. 
38 JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 
81 (2004). The 1959 legislation did not settle the matter altogether. See id. After the state 
labor board interpreted the statute not to impose an enforceable duty to bargain on public 
employers, Wisconsin reestablished the bargaining right through 1972 legislation. See id. 
39 See KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 22, at 1 (declaring that a “new era in 
American education began on the morning of 11 April 1962” when New York teachers 
went on strike in a bid to convince the city to bargain with the union); Richard D. 
Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS 7, 7, 11 (Jane 
Hannaway & Andrew Rotherham eds., 2006) (calling Shanker’s efforts “the watershed 
moment” in the movement for teacher unionization). The teachers won bargaining rights 
by exerting pressure on the city through a strike that was illegal under state law. Id. at 13. 
40 The vast majority of states had authorized bargaining by 1979. See LORRAINE 
MCDONNELL & ANTHONY PASCAL, ORGANIZED TEACHERS IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 28 
(1979) (report prepared for the National Institute of Education) (noting that in a sample of 
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policymakers fiercely debated the scope of bargaining—the set of 
rules determining which topics could be included in bargaining 
between unions and their government employers, usually by 
classifying topics as “mandatory,” “permissive,” and “prohibited.”41 
Most state statutes designated some topics as mandatory, meaning 
that school districts and unions were required to bargain over the 
topics in good faith.42 Additionally, an employer may not implement 
policy changes affecting mandatory topics without first consulting the 
union.43 Other topics were permissive. The employer and union may 
bargain over permissive topics if and only if both parties agree to do 
so, and either party may implement unilateral challenges on such 
topics absent an agreement.44 Finally, the scope of bargaining rules 
may designate prohibited or “illegal” topics—topics on which the 
                                                                                                         
thirty three states, twenty five states authorized bargaining); see also DIANE RAVITCH, 
THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945–1980, at 315 (1983) (“By the 
mid-1970s, there was nothing tenuous about the position of teacher unions. . . . Indeed, 
both the AFT and the NEA had become major powers, not only in their school districts but 
in state legislatures and in the nation.”). Five states continue to ban all bargaining today. 
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-98 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting 
teacher collective bargaining as “against the public policy of the State, illegal, unlawful, 
void and of no effect”); TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. § 617.002 (West, Westlaw through 2011 
Reg. Sess.) (barring districts from entering into collective bargaining agreements or even 
“recogniz[ing] a labor organization as the bargaining agent for a group of public 
employees”); Commonwealth v. Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty., 232 S.E.2d 30, 44–45 (Va. 
1977); Chatham Ass’n of Educators, Teacher Unit v. Bd. of Public Educ., 204 S.E.2d 138, 
140 (Ga. 1974) (holding that teacher collective bargaining agreements are “void, being 
illegal attempts by the board to delegate its powers and authority”). The situation in South 
Carolina is more complicated, as no state legislation either authorizes or prohibits 
collective bargaining. 
41 See Corbett, supra note 18, at 237–39. 
42 Nearly all states with public sector bargaining provide by statute that wages, hours, 
and “terms and conditions of employment” are mandatory for bargaining. This language is 
borrowed from the Wagner Act, the 1935 statute governing collective bargaining in the 
private sector. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309(1) (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.) (requiring bargaining over “wages, hours, and 
terms and conditions of employment”); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/7 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215(1) (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (requiring public employers and unions to “meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650(4), (7) (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Reg. Sess.) (requiring bargaining over “direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, 
vacations, sick leave, grievance procedures and other conditions of employment”). 
43 See Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral 
Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1985). For a case on the topic, see, for example, 
Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 406 A.2d 329, 331–32 (Pa. 1979) 
(holding that a public employer may not implement unilateral changes on mandatory 
bargaining topics even after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement). 
44 See GRODIN ET AL., supra note 38, at 205–06. 
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parties are not permitted to bargain.45 Courts will not enforce contract 
terms on illegal topics.46 When a topic is prohibited, or when a 
permissive topic is not included in bargaining, the employer will 
resolve the topic through other means; in the public sector, local 
governments will generally set policy on these topics through 
deliberations by the city council or school board or by administrative 
policymaking. 
The scope of bargaining for teachers was controversial from the 
beginning. Shanker’s union, for example, pushed for bargaining not 
only wages and benefits but also class size, enrichment programs, and 
discipline policy.47 The city resisted, claiming that bargaining over 
those topics would circumvent the normal democratic process and 
deny parents and community members their rightful place in 
determining important matters of education policy.48 As states 
defined the government’s obligations in bargaining, many state 
legislatures and courts adopted this reasoning in classifying topics as 
illegal for bargaining.49 As the New Jersey Supreme Court held in 
1982, issues such as school curriculum, class size, and the length of 
the school year were to be decided “not by negotiation and arbitration, 
but by the political process. This involves the panoply of democratic 
institutions and practices, including public debate, lobbying, voting, 
legislation and administration.”50 New Jersey was joined by 
Delaware,51 Nevada,52 Michigan,53 and Kansas,54 among others, in 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215(3)(g) (mandating that “collective 
bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its 
employees shall not include,” among other topics, “[t]he use of volunteers in providing 
services at its schools”). 
46 See Befort, supra note 43, at 1262–65 (describing this outcome in cases in New 
Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts). 
47 See Kahlenberg, supra note 39, at 13–14 (noting that the city’s school board “refused 
to delegate the making of policy to the union and exclude participation of parents and the 
public” (internal quotation marks, ellipses omitted)). The dispute contributed to a fourteen 
day strike in 1967. Id. at 14. 
48 Id. at 14. 
49 Professor Martin Malin has described at length the influence of the “view that public 
employee collective bargaining is antidemocratic” in a variety of state court cases limiting 
bargaining during the time period discussed in this Subpart. See Malin, supra note 18, at 
1372–75, 1384–86. Professor Malin also describes a secondary concern that “public sector 
collective bargaining impedes effective government.” Id. at 1375–84. For further 
discussion of that concern, see infra Part I.C. 
50 In re Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J. 1982). 
51 Colonial Sch. Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, NCCEA/DSEA/NEA, 449 A.2d 243, 247 
(Del. 1982) (holding that topics other than “salaries, employee benefits, and working 
conditions” are prohibited for bargaining (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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making certain topics illegal for bargaining even while requiring the 
government to bargain on other topics.55 
Supporters of a robust category of illegal topics saw bargaining as 
a short circuit in democracy because it excluded the general public 
from participation in policy decisions while giving disproportionate 
power to unions.56 Professor William Corbett encapsulated the 
concern in a law review article published in 1979. Corbett wrote: 
“When fundamental public policy issues are at stake, the decision-
making process should not be defined so as to preclude or inhibit 
public participation. To do so would announce the end of democratic 
control over public processes.”57 Corbett did not believe that 
bargaining needed to be eliminated completely because “th[e] use of 
the bilateral decision making process”—collective bargaining—was 
acceptable for decisions on which “wider public participation is not 
necessary.”58 But when a “fundamental concern is involved, public 
participation is required for its proper consideration and resolution, 
and the bilateral process is inappropriate.”59 Corbett considered and 
rejected the notion that the public could participate by communicating 
                                                                                                         
52 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 288.150(3) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) 
(listing illegal topics). 
53 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.) 
(listing illegal topics, including the starting day of the school year and the use of 
volunteers). 
54 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413(l)(3) (making school scheduling illegal for bargaining). 
55 At the same time, many states declined to classify any topics as illegal, making all 
topics either mandatory or permissive. For example, in Illinois, bargaining is mandatory 
for “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/10(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). Other topics are permissive. Mt. 
Vernon Educ. Ass’n, 10 Pub. Emp. Reporter for Ill. ¶ 1058, 234, 236 (Ill. Educ. Labor 
Relations Bd. Mar. 17, 1994). 
56 See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 18, at 258; June Miller Weisberger, The Appropriate 
Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin 
Experience, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 685, 688, 696 (1977) (“The main public sector justification 
for excluding a legal topic from the mandated bargaining process is that . . . collective 
bargaining gives too much power to one special interest group, public employee unions, 
and distorts the effectiveness of the political process by causing an underrepresentation of 
other important interest groups of citizens unless the scope of bargaining is exceedingly 
narrow.”). Critics have continued to advance this argument since it became popular in the 
1970s. See, e.g., Eric C. Scheiner, Taking the Public Out of Determining Government 
Policy: The Need for an Appropriate Scope of Bargaining Test in the Illinois Public 
Sector, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 531, 554–58 (1996) (arguing that through collective 
bargaining “the voting public is deprived of their right to determine important government 
policy”). 
57 Corbett, supra note 18, at 258. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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its preferences to the public officials negotiating with the union.60 If 
such communication came prior to bargaining, it would be based on 
merely “theoretical proposals,” and therefore would be meaningless.61 
And input could not come during negotiations because bargaining 
proposals were often secret and, in any case, soliciting 
contemporaneous input would cause the bargaining process to grind 
to a halt.62 
Corbett and his peers utilized the vocabulary of process and 
transparency, but they, like the critics of the first era, were 
fundamentally concerned that bargaining was a non-majoritarian 
process that would favor the preferences of unions over those of the 
public. Corbett wrote that bargaining could give unions increased and 
disproportionate “access and influence,” thereby leading to results 
that “favor the employee organization.”63 Another scholar described 
the primary critique of bargaining in this era as the argument that 
bargaining would give “too much power to one special interest group” 
and cause “an underrepresentation of other important interest 
groups.”64 
Bargaining critics in this era advocated a balancing test in which a 
topic would be illegal for bargaining if the public’s interest in 
affecting the resolution of the topic outweighed employees’ interest in 
bargaining over the topic.65 A similar test eventually became law 
under the federal statute governing private employers.66 In the public 
sector, too, some state courts adopted the test.67 In other states, 
                                                 
60 Id. at 262. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 263. 
63 Id. at 256. 
64 Weisberger, supra note 56, at 696. 
65 Corbett, supra note 18, at 267. Actually, Corbett’s balancing test was a little more 
complicated: The employee’s interest had to be weighed against both the public’s interest 
in policy formulation and the public employer’s managerial interest. See id. Most other 
commentators treated the latter two considerations as a single factor. The test is similar to 
that used in the private sector to determine whether a topic is mandatory or permissive. See 
First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981). 
66 Under the National Labor Relations Act, where a topic has direct effect on both the 
employment relationship and the “direction of the enterprise,” the topic is mandatory if 
“the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, 
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.” First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 
U.S. at 677–79. Most other topics are mandatory. 
67 See, e.g., Cent. City Educ. Ass’n, IEA/NEA v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 599 
N.E.2d 892, 905–06 (Ill. 1992). 
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legislatures specifically enumerated prohibited topics.68 In both cases, 
the topics most often deemed prohibited included the length of the 
school day and year, as well as rules for distributing staff between 
schools and subject areas and for laying off teachers during a 
reduction in force.69 
After the 1980s, controversy over the scope of bargaining declined, 
and the issue received little scholarly or political attention until recent 
years. 
C. 2010 to the Present: Bargaining as Budget Buster and Handcuff70 
The relative peace surrounding the scope of public sector 
bargaining ended in 2010.71 In recent years, the majoritarian critique 
has appeared again but has taken a new form. First, critics have 
vigorously attacked public sector collective bargaining as 
unjustifiably expensive in a time when states are facing budget 
shortfalls.72 According to a 2010 editorial in the Wall Street Journal, 
the “desperate economic and fiscal woes” caused by public employee 
unions was possibly “the single biggest problem” for the American 
economy.73 That viewpoint was championed by Wisconsin governor 
Scott Walker, who declared months after his inauguration that 
bargaining rights for public employees were an “expensive 
entitlement.”74 Walker and other critics focused particularly on public 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 288.150(3) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. 
Sess.) (listing illegal topics). 
69 For examples, see infra Part IV.B. 
70 For a detailed discussion of this period in public sector labor relations, see Joseph E. 
Slater, Public-Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J. 189, 192–215 (2012). 
71 See, e.g., Michael Powell, Public Workers Face Outrage as Budget Crises Grow, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02showdown 
.html (“Across the nation, a rising irritation with public employee unions is palpable, as a 
wounded economy has blown gaping holes in state, city and town budgets, and revealed 
that some public pension funds dangle perilously close to bankruptcy.”). 
72 Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT’L AFFAIRS, at 3, 4 
(2010), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100918_DiSalvo_pdf[1].pdf 
(“The cost of public-sector pay and benefits (which in many cases far exceed what 
comparable workers earn in the private sector), combined with hundreds of billions of 
dollars in unfunded pension liabilities for retired government workers, are weighing down 
state and city budgets. And staggering as these burdens seem now, they are actually poised 
to grow exponentially in the years ahead.”). 
73 Editorial, The Public-Union Ascendancy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010, at A16, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038370045750134240606 
49464.html. 
74 See Steve Schultze & Don Walker, Walker Says He Should Have Prepared Public 
Earlier for His Sweeping Changes, J. SENTINEL ONLINE (June 27, 2011), http://www 
.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/124627903.html. 
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employees’ benefits, such as pensions and health care coverage.75 In 
addition, and apart from costs, critics claimed that the rigidity of the 
bargaining process and bargaining agreements eliminated any hope of 
reforming schools and other public institutions.76 According to 
Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels, teacher contracts were “handcuffs 
that reduce [school districts’] ability to meet the higher expectations 
we now have for student achievement.”77 
It takes some effort to untangle the arguments advanced by the 
most recent critics of public sector bargaining, but ultimately both the 
“expensive entitlement” and “handcuff” depend on the fundamental 
assumption that unions exert disproportionate power in the bargaining 
process. Start with the first critique. When critics argue that 
bargaining is too expensive, they are not referring to costs incurred in 
the negotiating process—the meetings, the expert consultants, or the 
gallons of coffee. Rather, the expense at issue is the difference 
between the cost to the government of terms and conditions of public 
employment determined through collective bargaining and the cost of 
the terms and conditions of public employment that would be set in 
the absence of bargaining. Thus, the claim seems to be based on two 
propositions. First, bargaining systematically leads to results that are 
more expensive to the government (and, conversely, more favorable 
to employees) than terms set through ordinary legislative and 
administrative processes. Second, the terms set through ordinary 
legislative and administrative processes are the appropriate baseline 
by which “expensiveness” should be measured. 
To justify the first proposition, critics argue that bargaining gives 
disproportionate influence to unions, allowing them to impose their 
favored policies, particularly with respect to compensation and 
benefits.78 As for the notion that the ordinary legislative and 
                                                 
75 See DiSalvo, supra note 72 (noting that states had “hundreds of billions of dollars in 
unfunded pension liabilities for retired government workers”). Even prior to recent 
bargaining restrictions, pension benefits for most public employees were set by statute 
rather than through bargaining, though some bargaining critics have glossed over the 
distinction. See Slater, supra note 70, at 192–98. 
76 See, e.g., Philip K. Howard, The Public-Union Albatross, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2011, 
at A15. 
77 Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., 2011 State of the State Address 5 (Jan. 11, 2011) (transcript 
available at http://www.in.gov/gov/11stateofstate.htm). 
78 See, e.g., David G. Crane, Should Public Employees Have Collective Bargaining?, 
S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 27, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Should       
-public-employees-have-collective-2473273.php (arguing that collective bargaining makes 
public employees’ benefits and compensation “more responsive to public employees than 
to ‘shareholders,’ that is, citizens benefiting from public services”). 
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administrative processes set the baseline by which expensiveness 
should be measured, critics presumably believe that the terms of 
employment set through those processes reflect the real value of 
services provided by public employees.79 Thus, the “expensive 
entitlement” argument is intertwined with the notion that collective 
bargaining is countermajoritarian, though it is focused specifically on 
the cost of labor agreements. 
The handcuff critique is harder to parse, in part because critics 
complain about two different kinds of inflexibility. Some critics 
worry that the policies established by collective bargaining 
agreements cannot be expediently modified in response to changing 
circumstances, since any modification must be preceded by often 
lengthy negotiation.80 This concern has featured prominently, for 
example, in discussions about collective bargaining rights for 
employees of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).81 
Opponents of collective bargaining argued that the TSA needed the 
capability to rapidly adjust its procedures and reassign or relocate 
employees in response to a changing landscape of security threats.82  
Professor Martin Malin has characterized this concern as one about 
“effective government” and distinguished it from  concerns that 
collective bargaining  is “antidemocratic.”83 
As manifested in the TSA context, the handcuff critique seems 
focused not on the particular terms of collective bargaining 
agreements, but rather on very existence of collective bargaining.  
One might argue, for example, that virtually any agreement covering 
TSA agents could become outdated at the drop of a hat (or the drop of 
a bomb). But in most situations, the degree of managerial discretion is 
itself a subject of negotiation, and inflexibility is a product of the 
particular terms embodied in collective bargaining agreements. 
                                                 
79 An alternative version of the argument asserts that market value should be 
determined through reference to the compensation received by private employees with 
similar education or similar job responsibilities. In advocating bargaining prohibitions, 
proponents of this approach must believe that ordinary democratic processes will produce 
results closer to this notion of market value than will the bargaining process. 
80 See Malin, supra note 18, at 1377–80. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. at 1369–80 (distinguishing the concerns that collective bargaining is 
antidemocratic and impedes effective government). Professor Malin also classifies the 
concern with public employee strikes as an “effective government” critique. Id. at 1375–
76. This Article treats arguments against strikes as distinct from arguments against 
collective bargaining. See supra note 28 (noting that organizing rights can be distinguished 
from bargaining rights). 
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Proponents of the handcuff critique have most often targeted teacher 
contracts, arguing that managers need flexibility not to respond to 
grand unexpected events but rather to align day-to-day personnel 
decisions, like pay and dismissal, to teachers’ performance. In 
particular, critics claim that teacher contracts often establish lockstep 
salary scales and “last in first out” layoff systems that prevent such 
discretion and therefore represent bad policy from the day those 
agreements are signed.84 
Critics of teacher bargaining claim that unions have different 
preferences than the public with respect to the degree of management 
discretion in personnel decisions and that unions use collective 
bargaining to force their preference for limited flexibility.85 In this 
account, teachers favor inflexible contract terms because such terms 
provide them with “convenience” and security, so they use bargaining 
to pursue those terms.86 Consequently, this version of the handcuff 
concern is best characterized as a majoritarian critique of collective 
bargaining.87 
In response to the expensive entitlement and handcuff concerns, 
several state legislatures have narrowed the scope of bargaining in 
recent years, though voters in two states rejected those limitations 
through referenda. Under recent legislation in Wisconsin, public 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., Andrew J. Rotherham, Beyond Unions: Five New Rules for Teachers, TIME 
(Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2053465,00.html 
(arguing that school districts should abolish “[i]nflexible salary schedules” that are based 
solely on “length of service and academic degrees”). Terry Moe, perhaps the most 
prominent academic critic of teacher bargaining, exhaustively documents and critiques a 
variety of contract terms commonly found in collective bargaining agreements between 
teachers and districts. MOE, supra note 18, at 174–214. 
85 See, e.g., Howard Fuller & George A. Mitchell, A Culture of Complaint, EDUC. 
NEXT, at 18, 22 (2006) (arguing that education reform is impeded by inflexible rules in 
teacher contracts because bargaining shuts out the public, thereby creating an “uneven 
playing field” that favors unions). 
86 See MOE, supra note 18, at 179 (claiming that because unions “do not want 
administrators to have discretion,” they negotiate for labor agreements containing “rules 
for every contingency” to benefit the “convenience of teachers”); HESS & WEST, supra 
note 5, at 6 (arguing that collective bargaining is an obstacle to reform because “[t]eachers 
unions favor existing arrangements that protect jobs, restrict the demands placed on 
members, limit accountability for student performance, and safeguard the privileges of 
senior teachers . . . whatever their implications for student achievement”). 
87 A distinct argument is that collective bargaining has a peculiar tendency to produce 
rules that are encyclopedic and therefore inflexible. But that notion seems suspect in light 
of the great complexity of many statutes and regulations created outside of bargaining by 
democratically elected and appointed officials, including the rules of the Office of 
Personnel Management, which govern employment in the federal government. See 
generally 5 C.F.R. 
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employees, including teachers, can bargain only over wages, and even 
then cannot negotiate for any wage increase that exceeds the 
percentage change in the consumer price index.88 In Indiana, teachers 
and school districts may no longer bargain over the school calendar, 
teacher evaluation, and teacher dismissal.89 Idaho limited teacher 
bargaining to compensation as part of a package of bills labeled 
“Students Come First,”90 but a substantial majority of voters rejected 
the legislation in a subsequent referendum.91 Similarly, the Ohio 
legislature passed a law prohibiting bargaining with teachers over 
several topics, including class size and staff deployment, and voters 
later repealed the law by referendum.92 Meanwhile, the Tennessee 
legislature replaced the state’s teacher collective bargaining law with 
a statute providing for “collaborative conferencing,”93 a process in 
                                                 
88 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, § 245 (Jan. 2011) (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 111.70(4)(mb) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 286)). Districts and unions can bargain 
only over “total base wages,” not merit pay or supplemental compensation. Id. A 
municipality can increase wages beyond the consumer price index if the change is 
approved in a local referendum. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.0506, 118.245 (West, 
Westlaw through 2011 Act 286). 
89 S.B. 575, § 10, 2011 Leg., 117th Sess. (Ind. 2011) (codified at IND. CODE. ANN. 20-
29-6-4.5 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.). 
90 See S.B. 1108, § 15, 2011 Leg., 61st Sess. (Idaho 2011) (codified at IDAHO CODE 
ANN. 33-1271 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.)) (“The board of trustees of 
each school district . . . is hereby empowered to and shall . . . negotiate with such party in 
good faith on matters related to compensation of professional employees.”). For further 
detail, see Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho Senate Passes Two School Reform Bills, THE 
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2011/feb/24/idaho 
-senate-backs-first-school-reform-bill-20-15/. 
91 Scott Odell, Ballot Propositions in Idaho: A Lesson for Education Policy Reform, 
EDUC. NEXT (Nov. 30, 2012), http://educationnext.org/ballot-propositions-in-idaho-a         
-lesson-for-education-policy-reform/ (noting that 57 percent of voters voted to repeal the 
law). 
92 Sean Cavanagh, Ohio Voters Reject Law Limiting Teachers’ Collective Bargaining, 
EDWEEK.COM (Nov. 8, 2011), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2011/11 
/ohio_1.html. 
93 “Collaborative conferencing” is defined as: 
[T]he process by which the chair of a board of education and the board’s 
professional employees, or such representatives as either party or parties may 
designate, meet at reasonable times to confer, consult and discuss and to 
exchange information, opinions and proposals on matters relating to the terms 
and conditions of professional employee service, using the principles and 
techniques of interest-based collaborative problem-solving. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-602(2) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.). Under 
this statute, collaborative conferencing is required if the following conditions are met in a 
given yearly cycle: First, fifteen percent of teachers must submit a written request to 
conduct collaborative conferencing. § 49-5-605 (Westlaw). Second, a majority of teachers 
must vote to authorize collaborative conferencing. Id. 
ROSENTHAL 4/4/2013  8:27 AM 
694 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 673 
which school districts and teachers can discuss a variety of topics but 
neither side is obligated to try to reach agreement.94 In collaborative 
conferencing, Tennessee school districts and unions may discuss 
salary, working conditions, grievance procedures, insurance, leave, 
payroll deductions, and fringe benefits (excluding pensions).95 All 
other topics are prohibited for discussion, including teacher 
evaluation and staff deployment.96 These recent limitations on 
bargaining are intended, according to their supporters, to prevent 
unions from exerting disproportionate influence to shape policy at the 
expense of public preferences.97 
II 
ASSESSING THE MAJORITARIAN CRITIQUE 
As shown in Part I, critics of collective bargaining have been 
largely unified in their focus on the perceived countermajoritarian 
character of collective bargaining. In this Part and those that follow, 
the Article accepts the critics’ implicit premise that majoritarianism is 
the most important criterion in assessing policymaking systems. But 
this Part argues that critics have erred in concluding that majoritarian 
concerns justify bargaining prohibitions.  In fact, even in a system of 
bargaining in which nearly all topics are open for negotiation, local 
governments can retain the ability to advance public preferences, 
while the alternative legislative and administrative processes for 
setting policy are likely no more majoritarian than collective 
bargaining. 
In making this argument, the Article envisions a robust system of 
collective bargaining that includes a significant category of topics that 
are permissive for bargaining, including many topics bearing on 
recent education reform debates, such as the length of the school day. 
                                                 
94 Although Tennessee law requires school districts to participate in collaborative 
conferencing, there is no obligation to bargain in good faith. See § 49-5-606(a) (Westlaw) 
(describing school district obligations). 
95 § 49-5-608(a) (Westlaw). 
96 § 49-5-608(b) (Westlaw). 
97 Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, for example, said the following shortly after his 
election in 2010: 
We can no longer live in a society where the public employees are the haves and 
taxpayers who foot the bills are the have-nots . . . The bottom line is that we are 
going to look at every legal means we have to try to put that balance more on the 
side of taxpayers. 
Steven Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Labor Unions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2011, at A1, A3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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On these topics, the school district and union are not required to 
bargain unless both agree to do so, although, under the doctrine of 
“effects bargaining,” the parties often must negotiate over the 
consequences of changes on permissive topics.98 The permissive 
designation allows local government officials to seek compromise 
with employees on policy issues but to cease bargaining if 
compromise fails. Although this conception of robust collective 
bargaining does not correspond to the broadest possible scope of 
bargaining, in which nearly all topics are mandatory, it is fitting here 
for two reasons. First, it resembles current law in most states that have 
not prohibited or severely curtailed bargaining.99 Second, the 
Article’s primary goal is to argue that bargaining prohibitions are not 
necessary to ensure majoritarianism, so the Article need only defend a 
bargaining system that does not utilize such prohibitions. 
This Part first describes the important role of government officials 
in collective bargaining, which has generally been ignored by 
bargaining critics. It then rebuts two constitutive arguments in the 
majoritarian critique. First, that the structure of the bargaining process 
gives unions power over education policy. Second, that the lack of 
public transparency in bargaining allows unions to exercise that 
power unchecked. 
A. The Role of Local Legislatures and Government Negotiators 
Critics of public sector bargaining typically focus on the role of 
unions in the bargaining process, but they rarely discuss the important 
functions played by local legislative bodies and government 
negotiators in that process.100 In brief, local legislatures decide 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., W. Irondequoit Teachers Ass’n v. Helsby, 315 N.E.2d 775, 777–78 (N.Y. 
1974) (holding that, although class size is not mandatory for bargaining, its impact on 
teachers must be bargained for). For example, if a school district decides to extend the 
school year from 180 days to 200 days, the district would be required to bargain over the 
effect on teacher’s pay. 
99 For example, according to the database of the National Council on Teacher Quality, 
in most states with bargaining, the following topics are permissive: dismissals, layoffs, 
teacher evaluation, class size, and the length of the school day and year. See National 
Council on Teacher Quality, State Bargaining Rules, TCHR. RULES, ROLES AND RTS., 
http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope/#interactiveMap (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
100 Rather than discuss these functions in any detail, bargaining critics often claim 
instead that local government officials are captured by union influence and therefore 
unwilling to pursue public preferences. See, e.g., MOE, supra note 18, at 177–79. As this 
Article argues below, this claim, even if true, does not justify bargaining restrictions 
because the same supposedly captured government officials who oversee bargaining 
would also set policy in the absence of bargaining. 
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whether to approve and fund tentative labor agreements, which result 
from negotiations in which the public is represented by a government 
negotiating team. This Part provides a brief introduction to these 
functions, and the topic is examined in greater depth in Part III. 
Just as union members must ratify a collective bargaining 
agreement before it can come into effect, a school board, city council, 
or local government equivalent must approve a teacher contract 
before it can be put into operation.101 In many cases, the requirement 
for government approval of a teacher contract—namely, a majority 
vote of a local legislative body—is the same as the process that would 
be required for the establishment of terms and conditions of public 
employment in the absence of bargaining.102 Aside from contract 
approval, the local city council or other legislative body often has the 
power to allocate or withhold funds necessary to implement the 
agreement.103 Consequently, in nearly all cases, a local legislative 
body has the power to prevent implementation of a collective 
bargaining agreement that contradicts the preferences of the public, 
the same power that exists outside of bargaining. 
When a collective bargaining agreement is presented to the school 
board or city council for approval or financing, there are often public 
hearings, and citizens and interest groups can attempt to influence 
legislators through lobbying or public pressure.104 In an analogous 
situation at the federal level, the President may make decisions on 
international treaties with minimal public involvement, but senate 
ratification can provoke significant debate among legislators and the 
                                                 
101 GRODIN ET AL., supra note 38, at 2. According to a recent estimate, ninety percent 
of school board members are elected; others are appointed. See E. GORDON GEE & PHILIP 
T.K. DANIEL, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 9 (4th ed. 2008). In 
recent years, some cities have established mayoral control over public schools, a system 
that generally gives the mayor responsibility for government approval of teacher contracts, 
but mayoral control is still relatively rare. See MOE, supra note 18, at 154. 
102 However, one difference between approval of tentative collective bargaining 
agreements and statutes is that collective bargaining agreements cannot be amended by the 
legislature. See infra Part III.A. 
103 In Washington, D.C., for example, the mayor approves teacher contracts, but those 
contracts cannot come into effect until the city council appropriates funds necessary to 
implement them. See D.C. CODE § 1-617.17(j) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 11, 2012). 
104 News archives are well-stocked with accounts of such activities. See, e.g., Dafney 
Tales & Valerie Russ, Dueling Protests Fault Teacher Pact: For Different Reasons, They 
Have Doubts, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 27, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-01-27 
/news/24956126_1_teachers-union-teacher-assignments-teacher-contract (describing 
protests by various groups criticizing a tentative teacher contract). 
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public.105 Indeed, for both treaties and collective bargaining 
agreements, public debate can occur even while negotiations are 
ongoing. 
Moreover, before tentative collective bargaining agreements reach 
the city council or school board, another group of public officials 
negotiates with the union to reach those agreements. The 
government’s negotiating team is commonly led by an appointed head 
of the school district, another district administrator, or a school board 
member, often working with a variety of government officials, 
lawyers, outside consultants, and others.106 As the parties reach 
compromises and draft language, this negotiating team acts on behalf 
of the government and, at least in theory, the public. In some 
localities, the school board closely oversees the government’s 
negotiating team, while in others, the negotiating team acts with a 
high degree of autonomy.107 In either case, as described in the 
remainder of this Part, government negotiators have a variety of tools 
at their disposal to ensure majoritarian outcomes in collective 
bargaining. 
B. The Union’s Role in Bargaining 
Despite the critical role of government officials in creating and 
approving collective bargaining agreements, critics argue that the 
process allows an interest group—the relevant union—to play a 
disproportionate role in policymaking, thereby distorting policy in 
favor of that group’s interests. The most severe version of the concern 
suggests that the bargaining process gives unions a kind of veto 
power over education policy: No agreement can be concluded without 
the union’s consent, and the union can therefore prevent the 
establishment of a policy proposal that it finds unacceptable.108 
                                                 
105 See, e.g., Benjamin S. Loeb, The Limited Test Ban Treaty, in THE POLITICS OF 
ARMS CONTROL TREATY RATIFICATION 167, 198–204 (Michael Krepon & Dan Caldwell 
eds., 1991) (describing extensive floor debate over the Limited Test Ban Treaty). 
106 See WILLIAM L. SHARP, WINNING AT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: STRATEGIES 
EVERYONE CAN LIVE WITH 50–52 (2003) (describing a 1999 survey showing that more 
than a fifth of school districts had the superintendent act as the chief negotiator, with a 
majority using some combination of the superintendent, school board members, and 
district officials.). 
107 See infra Section III.A. 
108 See, e.g., PAUL KERSEY, MACKINAC CENTER, RECONSIDERING MICHIGAN’S 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT: RESTORING BALANCE TO PUBLIC-SECTOR 
LABOR RELATIONS 11–14 (2011) (describing public sector collective bargaining as giving 
veto power to unions). 
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In fact, even for mandatory topics of bargaining, there are few 
situations in which a union has a real veto over education policy. In 
most states with collective bargaining for public employees, there is a 
statutory process for resolving bargaining stalemates. That process 
sometimes allows school districts to unilaterally implement their last 
offer if the parties remain at impasse for a specified period of time, 
allowing a direct path around any union attempt to veto a bargaining 
proposal.109 In other states, statutory impasse procedures require the 
school and union to submit to binding arbitration,110 mediation, or 
fact-finding that is effectively binding.111 These processes allow 
contract terms to be imposed without union consent.112 
                                                 
109 See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 3505.7 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) 
(allowing school districts to implement their “last, best and final offer” if mediation and 
fact-finding does not lead to an agreement); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9 (West, 
Westlaw through ch. 353 of 2012 Legis. Sess.) (allowing public employers to implement 
unilateral changes after the exhaustion of impasse procedures); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
243.712(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (allowing public employers to 
implement their last offer if statutory impasse procedures do not lead to an agreement). 
110 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153f(b)–(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Feb. 
Reg. Sess. and June 12 Special Sess.) (requiring mediation and then arbitration, with 
arbitrators’ rulings binding unless rejected by two-thirds of the relevant legislative body); 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.19–.22 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (in the event of 
an impasse, requiring school districts and unions that have not agreed to impasse 
procedures to submit to mediation, fact-finding, and then binding arbitration); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (West, Westlaw through 2012 First Special Sess.) (in the event of 
an impasse, empowering a state agency to submit disputes to binding arbitration); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 288.217(2) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (allowing either 
side to submit a bargaining dispute to binding arbitration if no agreement has been reached 
after four bargaining sessions); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.3-9 to -13 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (allowing either party in teacher contract negotiations to request 
binding arbitration on all matters not involving the expenditure of money). See also 
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.40.200(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.) 
(establishing binding arbitration for some classes of public employee, though not 
teachers); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (West, Westlaw through Act 239 of 2012 Reg. 
Sess.) (establishing binding arbitration for some classes of public employees, though not 
teachers); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring binding arbitration at impasse for police and firefighters); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW 
§ 209(2) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.) (requiring binding arbitration at 
impasse for some classes of public employees, though not teachers). 
111 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:12 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring mediation at impasse and allowing the local legislature to impose the mediator’s 
recommendation); see also OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4117.14(C)(6) (West, Westlaw 
through 2011 Legis. Sess.) (providing that the recommendation of a fact-finding panel 
after impasse will become binding unless three-fifths of the relevant legislative body or 
three-fifths of union members reject the recommendations). 
112 In addition, in most cases, state legislation will preempt subsequent collective 
bargaining agreements, providing another mechanism to enact policy without union 
approval, albeit one requiring action at the state level. See, e.g., Lieberman v. State Bd. of 
Labor Relations, 579 A.2d 505, 514–15 (Conn. 1990) (holding that a state freedom of 
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Admittedly, these statutory impasse procedures cannot resolve all 
majoritarian doubts about public sector bargaining. Relatively few 
states allow unilateral policy changes at impasse113 and binding 
arbitration may only exacerbate majoritarian concerns, since 
arbitrators are not accountable to the public. Furthermore, statutory 
impasse procedures only come into play when the school district and 
union bargain unsuccessfully for a period of time specified by state 
statute.114 But a period of unsuccessful bargaining, followed by fact-
finding, mediation, or arbitration—sometimes all three115—is a costly 
way to make policy, in both time and money, and it carries risk for all 
parties involved.116 If the public employer is deeply hesitant to utilize 
impasse procedures, it might feel pressured to withdraw proposals 
that are holding up a final deal, giving unions an effective veto over 
education policy. 
On permissive topics, however, the government has the power to 
avoid this scenario. When government negotiators believe that a 
union’s unbending position on a permissive topic is incompatible with 
public preferences, the negotiators can simply pull the topic off the 
bargaining table, leaving it to be determined through local legislation 
or administrative discretion.117 Under the rules for permissive topics, 
                                                                                                         
information statute preempted public sector collective bargaining agreements governing 
destruction of personnel files). 
113 See discussion supra note 109. 
114 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-13(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. 
Sess.) (60 days); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.712(1) (Westlaw) (150 days). 
115 See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.19–.22 (Westlaw) (requiring school districts and unions 
that have not agreed to other impasse procedures to submit to mediation, then fact-finding, 
and then binding arbitration at impasse). 
116 For example, the outcome of arbitration or fact-finding will be uncertain, and the 
process can lead to political instability. See Hess & Kelly, supra note 5, at 85 (calling 
arbitration at impasse a “costly, time-consuming process that antagonizes teachers and that 
administrators would rather avoid”). 
117 Inc. Vill. of Lynbrook v. N.Y. State Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 399 N.E.2d 55, 57 
n.1 (1979) (“[N]either party must continue to bargain on a permissive issue to the point of 
impasse.”). In applying state scope of bargaining rules, state courts typically rely on 
decisions interpreting the National Labor Relations Act, the federal law governing private 
employees. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass’n. v. Detroit, 214 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. 
1974) (relying on Kit Manufacturing Co., Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 662 (1964), aff’d 365 F.2d 
829 (9th Cir. 1966)). In Kit Manufacturing Company, Inc., the National Labor Relations 
Board held that that, in the private sector, a party can decline to bargain about a permissive 
topic at any time, even if the party has bargained over the topic previously. 150 N.L.R.B. 
at 666–68. See also Allied Chem, & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 
U.S. 157, 185–88 (1971) (holding that even after a permissive topic has been included in a 
collective bargaining agreement, the employer can make unilateral changes on that topic 
when the agreement expires). 
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the union will be barred from insisting that the government agree to 
terms on the topic—or even listen to proposals on the topic—as a 
condition of reaching agreement on other topics under negotiation.118 
Unions are also not permitted to threaten strikes or exert other types 
of pressure to prevent government negotiators from invoking their 
power to halt bargaining, as those actions would constitute bad faith 
bargaining.119 
Government negotiators can therefore avoid any union veto 
through use of their power under the permissive designation, and they 
can also gain bargaining leverage by threatening to use that power. 
While Part III of this Article discusses political and social reasons that 
local governments might fail to remove permissive topics from 
bargaining even when the union’s position makes it difficult to 
advance public preferences, for now, the point is that government 
negotiators have the ability to take such action. Any hesitance to do 
so must be attributed to factors other than the structure of the 
bargaining process. 
Even if bargaining does not give unions a veto over education 
policy, critics claim that unions’ prominent role in bargaining allows 
them to exert disproportionate influence on education policy. 
Bargaining gives unions a special set of procedural tools in shaping 
education policy: the ability to make proposals directly to 
policymakers, along with significant face time with public officials to 
advocate for those proposals, and the ability to complicate the 
implementation of competing proposals (even if they cannot veto 
such proposals outright).120 Some critics say that states are justified in 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., Pasco Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Pasco, 938 P.2d 827, 833–34 (Wash. 
1997). The Washington Supreme Court decision relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), where the Court 
held that a party who insists on a permissive topic violates the scope of bargaining rules 
because “such conduct is, in substance, a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are 
within the scope of mandatory bargaining.” Id. at 349. 
119 See, e.g., Nassau Ins. Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 878, 885 (1986) (finding an NLRA 
violation where the union struck in order to pressure the employer to accept terms on a 
permissive topic). In September 2012, the City of Chicago claimed that the ongoing strike 
by its teachers was an illegal strike over permissive topics, though the case became moot 
before it was decided. See Plaintiff’s Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 
1–2, Bd. of Educ. v. Chi. Teachers Union, No. CHI-1863170v1 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Ill. 
Sept. 17, 2012) (arguing that the strike was “unlawful . . . because it is in response to a 
dispute between the [Chicago Teachers Union] and the Board of Education over 
permissive subjects of bargaining”). 
120 See Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental 
Decisionmaking, 44 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 669, 674 (1975) (noting that union 
representatives get “direct and intensive access” to public officials through bargaining). 
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giving unions these tools on certain topics, like wages or grievance 
procedures, that are at the core of teachers’ personal interest.121 But 
these critics maintain that unions should not have these tools on topics 
like the length of the school day, on which the public has a very 
significant interest that should not be outweighed by the interest of 
any particular group of citizens.122 
This argument is the most powerful aspect of the traditional 
majoritarian critique, but it is not persuasive when examined closely. 
In the modern American political system, the tools utilized by teacher 
unions in bargaining—most significantly, direct access to 
lawmakers—are available to interest groups in the ordinary legislative 
and administrative process. The result, as described in an oft-cited 
study of interest group influence, is that those groups’ “organization 
and action are often more influential than public opinion for 
determining policy outcomes.”123 At the federal and state levels, it is 
well established that lobbyists for interest groups interact extensively 
with congressional representatives and their staffs.124 Legislators 
regularly take input from interest groups on bills and amendments, 
often putting those groups’ ideas directly into legislative proposals.125 
As for the regulatory process, Professor Jody Freeman has argued 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 18, at 259 (“[T]here is general agreement that 
economic issues (that is, wages, hours, and fringe benefits) are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, because the legitimate interests of the employees outweigh any employer 
policy implementation interests”). 
122 See id. at 258–59 (arguing that “when the topics in the public sector are of 
fundamental public interest, the bilateral process is inappropriate”). 
123 JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, 
AND INFLUENCE 2 (2003). 
124 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 
138–41 (5th ed. 2009) (describing the role of lobbyists in the legislative process). Trade 
associations are one well-studied set of interest groups with significant access to 
legislators. See Lee Drutman, Trade Associations, the Collective Action Dilemma, and the 
Problem of Cohesion, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 74, 74–86 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett 
A. Loomis eds., 8th ed. 2012). 
125 See BERTRAM J. LEVINE, THE ART OF LOBBYING: BUILDING TRUST AND SELLING 
POLICY 235 (2009) (in a survey of sixty-five federal policymakers, finding that 58% of 
respondents “welcomed legislative drafts, etc., from lobbyists” and 39% of respondents 
“received many ideas for legislation (including amendments) from lobbyists”); BERRY & 
WILCOX, supra note 123, at 138 (noting that committee staff sometimes “put lobbyists’ 
ideas directly into drafts of legislation”). Similarly, lobbyists can “squelch proposals 
before they receive formal consideration.” WRIGHT, supra note 122, at 39. A particularly 
prominent example of interest group influence can be found in the extensive federal farm 
subsidies that persist in large part due to lobbying by agricultural companies. Anthony 
Kammer, Cornography: Perverse Incentives and the United States Corn Subsidy, 8 J. 
FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 41–43, 53–61 (2012). 
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persuasively that private actors are deeply involved in the 
administrative governance process126 as a result of, among other 
activities, privatization of public services,127 the official adoption of 
privately generated standards,128 and interplay between self-
regulation and government regulation.129 These dynamics play out in 
localities and states as well as at the federal level.130 In education, for 
example, the privately developed “Common Core” curriculum 
standards will be used by nearly all public schools after most states 
adopted those standards.131 
There is little majoritarian benefit to shifting education policy out 
of the bargaining process and into processes that are no less affected 
by special interest influence. Indeed, even when states prohibit 
bargaining on some topics, teacher unions themselves continue to 
play a highly active and effective role in shaping policy on those 
prohibited topics through the ordinary legislative and administrative 
processes.132 Teacher unions are among the top donors to national, 
state, and local political campaigns.133 They are likely at their most 
effective in influencing policymaking at the local level. In one study 
of local school board elections, incumbents who did not have a union 
                                                 
126 See generally Jody Freeman, Annual Regulation of Business Focus: Privatization, 
Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
813, 820 (2000); see also WRIGHT, supra note 122, at 52–53 (describing interest groups’ 
influence in administrative agencies). 
127 Although one might argue that the government can maintain the authority to 
determine rules and standards even while outsourcing implementation of that policy, 
Freeman argues that the distinction often fails in practice and offers as an example the 
wide discretionary power of guards at private prisons. See Freeman, supra note 125, at 
823–26. 
128 Id. at 827–31. 
129 Id. at 831–35. 
130 See id. at 820. 
131 See Stephanie Banchero, School-Standards Pushback, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2012, 
11:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230363040457739043107224 
1906.html (noting that forty-six states had adopted the standards after the Obama 
administration tied education grants to their adoption). 
132 See generally MOE, supra note 18, at 275–341 (describing the extensive political 
activities and influence of teacher unions). It is possible that a prohibition on all 
bargaining between districts and teachers would lead to a significant decrease in unions’ 
political strength and therefore limit unions’ ability to influence policy on topics outside of 
bargaining. Bargaining often serves as a union’s raison d’etre and, as Moe observes, “a 
bedrock of union strength and unity.” Id. at 69. If this is the goal that bargaining critics 
have in mind, they don’t usually admit it. In fact, most recent proposals to restrict 
bargaining continue to allow bargaining on some topics. See supra notes 87–94 and 
accompanying text. 
133 Id. at 290–94. 
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endorsement lost more often than not, but incumbents with union 
support won ninety-two percent of their races.134 
Bargaining critics might argue that bargaining is different because 
it gives special influence to just one interest group, while the ordinary 
legislative and administrative processes allow interest groups to battle 
among themselves, thereby providing some measure of balance.135 
Yet, any group can lobby the government officials who negotiate 
agreements and the school board members who approve them. And 
under a proposal like that described in Part IV of this paper, 
legislatures would have even more power to monitor and control 
bargaining, thereby increasing the ability of all concerned groups to 
exert influence on the bargaining process. 
C. Transparency and Public Involvement 
Perhaps, though, collective bargaining suffers from a distinct flaw: 
a dearth of transparency. Some critics argue that the closed and 
secretive nature of the bargaining process makes it more likely that 
bargaining outcomes will be inconsistent with majority 
preferences.136 From this perspective, bargaining takes place in a 
secret “smoke-filled room,”137 with the public learning of proposals 
only after negotiations have concluded.138 The opacity of bargaining 
                                                 
134 Terry M. Moe, Teacher Unions and School Board Elections, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL 
BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 254, 275 (William Howell ed., 2005). 
Admittedly, the data does not prove causation beyond doubt because it may simply be the 
case that unions support candidates who would have won in any case. Even if that is true, 
union endorsements and monetary contributions likely increase unions’ access to these 
winning candidates. 
135 Other influential groups in education include the large foundations established by 
Bill Gates, Eli Broad, and others, a group that Diane Ravitch calls the “billionaire boys’ 
club.” DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL 
SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 195–222 (2010). 
Ravitch claims that these foundations represent a “fundamentally antidemocratic” and 
“unusually powerful force” that have “taken it upon themselves to reform public 
education, perhaps in ways that would never the scrutiny of voters in any district or state.” 
Id. at 200–01. 
136 See Corbett, supra note 18, at 261. 
137 Summers, supra note 119, at 676. For a recent example of secrecy in bargaining, see 
Bill Turque, D.C. Teachers, Rhee Appear Close to Contract; Both Sides Might Yield Some 
Ground, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-09-11 
/news/36776793_1_rhee-grant-teachers-ineffective-teachers (noting that the district leader 
and teacher union president could not discuss negotiations due to a confidentiality 
agreement). 
138 Corbett, supra note 18, at 262; see also Hess & Kelly, supra note 5, at 77 (noting 
lack of media coverage of bargaining and attributing this largely to secrecy by both sides 
of the negotiation). 
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therefore makes it impossible for citizens to engage in the “actual 
exchange of ideas and participation” that is the “cornerstone of 
democratic decision making.”139 One scholar has even claimed that 
the lack of transparency in bargaining leads to “public apathy and a 
sense of hopelessness in making any critical judgment of the 
agreement.”140 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the transparency 
concern can be addressed without any modification to the scope of 
bargaining. For example, Andrew Rotherham and Jane Hannaway 
have persuasively argued that teacher contracts and bargaining 
proposals should be disseminated in the media to foster agreements 
that are better for students and more aligned with public 
preferences.141 In at least one state, California, the law already 
requires public meetings to be held throughout the bargaining 
process.142 Employers must present their initial proposals at a public 
meeting, and, in order to preserve opportunities for public comment, 
actual bargaining cannot occur until seven days after that meeting.143 
And as the Article has discussed, the requirement of legislative 
approval can lead to significant public debate, with government 
negotiators explaining their choices and legislators debating the 
merits of a tentative agreement.144 
Even setting aside these realities, proponents of the transparency 
concern seem to have an unrealistic conception of the lawmaking 
processes in which education policy issues would be resolved in the 
absence of bargaining. Notwithstanding the activities of interest 
groups, American citizens rarely participate in or directly observe the 
legislative process. In fact, typical lawmaking is non-transparent and 
closed to the public in many of the same ways as collective 
                                                 
139 Corbett, supra note 18, at 261. 
140 Summers, supra note 119, at 676. 
141 See Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham, Conclusion, in COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS 257, 264 
(Jane Hannaway & Andrew Rotherham eds., 2006); Andrew J. Rotherham, Behind the 
Chicago Teachers’ Strike: Why Talks Must Be Made Public, TIME (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/09/10/chicago-teachers-strike-why-negotiations-must-be-open  
-to-the-public/. 
142 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3523 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
143 Id. Yet, as Charles Kerchner and Douglas Mitchell observe: “[W]e were surprised to 
discover . . . how often the mechanisms for public participation go unused and how 
inconsequently public input tends to be. Indeed, the very people who press hardest to 
establish standards for public involvement seem to lose interest in the hearing process once 
the ground rules are agreed upon.” KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 22, at 142. 
144 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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bargaining.145 Former Stanford Law School Dean Larry Kramer has 
argued that legislative deliberations “are now carried on mainly 
behind-the-scenes: in committees or caucuses, between individuals, 
by e-mail, through staff, and so on.”146 Some bills are the result of 
secretive negotiations between party leaders, legislators (especially 
“swing” voters), representatives of the executive branch, interest 
groups, and others.147 At the federal level, calls for increased 
transparency in lawmaking—even by key participants in that 
process—have typically amounted to little.148 
Administrative policymaking is generally even less transparent. 
Admittedly, in rulemaking under the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act and many of its state analogs, agencies must solicit 
comments and publish a statement responding to the most significant 
of those statements and explaining the basis for adopting a rule.149 
But this form of public input does not allow citizens to directly 
participate in policymaking, and the influence of comment is not 
clear. Moreover, the notice and comment process as a whole tends to 
facilitate participation by groups who represent specialized interests 
rather than the broader public.150 
Meanwhile, state and local agencies and legislatures may not be 
any more transparent than their federal counterparts. Local officials 
can often act with much less press coverage and public scrutiny than 
the United States Congress or federal regulatory agencies.151 
                                                 
145 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 238 (2004). 
146 Id. 
147 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, White House Affirms Deal on Drug Cost: Will Block 
Any Move For Added Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at A1, A16 (describing a deal 
between the Obama administration and pharmaceutical companies on measures to limit 
costs to industry arising from health care reform legislation). 
148 Recall President Obama’s campaign promise to televise meetings between 
legislators and lobbyists over health care reform proposals. Peter Nicholas, Despite 
President Barack Obama’s Campaign Pledge, Washington Culture of Lobbyists and 
Earmarks Remains, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 2, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03 
-02/news/0903020338_1_earmarks-spending-bill-lobbyists. 
149 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (requiring a “concise general statement” of the “basis 
and purpose” for rules); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (describing the requirement). Many states have similar laws. See, e.g., KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13A.280(5)(e)–(f) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legislation). 
150 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN L. 
REV. 411, 472–74 (2005) (in an empirical study of rulemaking, finding a “paucity of broad 
public representation” in comments). 
151 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: Judicial 
Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 784 (2001) (“State 
governments may be able to act without public scrutiny. State officials may be elected in 
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Superintendents, for example, have often been criticized for refusing 
to share information with the public and even with their own local 
school boards.152 To assess the majoritarian implications of public 
sector collective bargaining, one must compare the bargaining process 
to these alternative legislative and administrative modes of setting 
policy, a comparison that hardly weighs against bargaining. 
III 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN BARGAINING 
Government officials typically have the tools to prevent 
countermajoritarian policy outcomes in bargaining, just as they do in 
legislation or rulemaking. But public officials can also choose not to 
use these tools—or fail to use them effectively. In other words, 
conflicts between public sector collective bargaining agreements and 
public preferences are best attributed not to the bargaining process but 
rather to the conduct of actors in that process—in the parlance of 
vehicle accidents, human error rather than system defect. 
For example, as the former superintendent of the Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin school district has written, collective bargaining 
agreements in that city failed to facilitate reform due to the 
“successive failures of Milwaukee’s elected school board and 
administration to use bargaining as a means for presenting and 
implementing a strategy of improving academic achievement.”153 
Conversely, Professor Terry Moe has described how district leaders in 
New York City and the District of Columbia managed to achieve 
significant education reforms, in spite of—and indeed, through—the 
                                                                                                         
less ideologically clear or less well-reported campaigns. And that lack of scrutiny and 
citizen participation may lead to state governments acting under the influence of well-
funded special interest groups that represent money, legal constructs or concentrated 
interests rather than votes.”). 
152 The author has heard this complaint from those close to school board members, and 
it is reflected in local education coverage. See Brian Charles, School Board Members Blast 
Districts of Lack of Transparency, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL. (Mar. 22, 2012, 5:38 
PM) (describing lack of transparency regarding misbehaving teachers); Keith Vance, 
School Board Wants More Information From Superintendent, BARRE-MONTPELIER TIMES 
ARGUS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120323 
/NEWS01/703239924/1003/NEWS01 (describing complaints by school board members 
regarding lack of transparency on the district budget). 
153 Howard L. Fuller et al., Collective Bargaining in Milwaukee Public Schools, in 
CONFLICTING MISSIONS?: TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 110, 113 
(Tom Loveless ed., 2000). 
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collective bargaining process.154 The most natural conclusion from 
Moe’s analysis of New York and D.C. is that those who disagree with 
unions on policy issues should be more effective in the political 
process in order to elect leaders who will utilize bargaining tools for 
reform (and who will appoint negotiators to do the same). In other 
words, bargaining rules are less important than the attributes of the 
public officials who act under those rules. 
Still, reformers should be concerned with ensuring that bargaining 
practices do not foster human error and instead facilitate government 
officials’ vigorous pursuit of public preferences in bargaining. 
This Part analyzes several factors that affect the government’s 
effectiveness as an agent of the public in bargaining. It concludes that 
the government is particularly likely to fail to advance public 
preferences in bargaining when two conditions occur. First, the 
relevant legislative body may decline to actively oversee the 
bargaining process, giving a wide range of discretion to government 
negotiators, such as the district superintendent. Second, these 
government negotiators may be poorly disposed and poorly 
incentivized to aggressively pursue public preferences in bargaining. 
This Part discusses each of these conditions in turn, showing that they 
can combine to create countermajoritarian bargaining outcomes. Part 
IV takes up the task of proposing reforms that address the specific 
problems described here. 
A. Oversight of the Bargaining Process 
School boards are generally thought to hold the reins for the 
government in the bargaining process.155 In discussing bargaining for 
teachers, most commentators describe a negotiation between a union 
and a school board.156 Most state statutes either specifically identify 
                                                 
154 See MOE, supra note 18, at 217–40 (detailing how both districts brought “radical 
reform to the labor contract”). 
155 In some localities, the power traditionally held by the school board is held by the 
mayor or another democratic institution; to avoid unnecessary complexity, this Part refers 
to school boards exclusively. 
156 See, e.g., Susan Moore Johnson & Morgaen L. Donaldson, The Effects of Collective 
Bargaining on Teacher Quality, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: 
NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS 111, 113 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew 
Rotherham eds., 2006) (“[U]nions and school boards in many states have been negotiating 
and signing contracts for more than 35 years . . . .”); SHARP, supra note 105, at 41 (“Every 
time a board of education begins to negotiate again, it has to decide who will represent the 
board at the bargaining table.”); TODD A. DEMITCHELL, LABOR RELATIONS IN 
EDUCATION: POLICIES, POLITICS, AND PRACTICES 109 (2010) (referring to government 
side of the bargaining table as the “school board bargaining team”). 
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school boards as the government’s bargaining representative or place 
responsibility for public sector bargaining on the “public employer” 
or “agency”157—in the case of teachers, the school district, which is 
overseen by the school board. The school board often selects the 
government negotiator and makes the final decision on whether to 
approve or deny a tentative agreement.158 
But school boards may not exert much control in the time between 
the beginning of negotiations and their conclusion. Although the 
school board’s oversight of the bargaining process has received 
strikingly little empirical study, some tentative conclusions are 
possible. School board members are typically not directly involved at 
the bargaining table, where tradeoffs are made and language 
drafted.159 As noted above, the negotiating team usually consists of a 
variety of school district officials, outside consultants, lawyers, and 
others, most commonly led by a superintendent or other central-office 
administrator.160 The school board may not actively oversee those 
officials. When, for example, the superintendent leads the bargaining 
process, she often acts with “full authority” at the negotiating table.161 
Indeed, despite the sometimes quick pace of bargaining, school 
boards usually meet only once or twice a month.162 
Bargaining can thus affect a shift in power over education policy 
within the government. In the absence of bargaining, the legislature 
would typically enact policy on topics such as terms and conditions of 
employment for school employees, the length of the school day and 
year, student discipline, attendance requirements for students, special 
                                                 
157 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 509.6 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. 
Sess.) (“The board of education and the representatives of the organization [teacher union] 
must negotiate in good faith . . . .”); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 204 (McKinney, Westlaw 
through 2012 Legis. Sess.) (“[T]he appropriate public employer shall be, and hereby is, 
required to negotiate collectively . . . .”). 
158 See supra Part I.A. 
159 See SHARP, supra note 105, at 51 (noting that, according to a 1999 survey, only one 
in five school districts had a school board member as the government’s chief spokesperson 
in bargaining). 
160 See id. (describing a 1999 survey showing that 22% of school districts—the largest 
portion in the study—had the superintendent act as the chief negotiator and another 16.3% 
filled the role with another central-office administrator.). 
161 See id. at 51–53 (showing that the superintendent had “full authority” in 21.3% of 
school districts—nearly the same as the percentage of districts in which the superintendent 
was the lead negotiator). 
162 According to a survey published in 2010 by the National School Board Association, 
forty percent of school boards reported meeting once per month and fifty-four percent 
reported meeting twice per month. FREDERICK M. HESS & OLIVIA MEEKS, SCHOOL 
BOARDS CIRCA 2010: GOVERNANCE IN THE ACCOUNTABILITY ERA 66 (2010). 
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education, class size, and more.163 When bargaining occurs, many of 
these topics are potentially decided through labor agreements.164 
Negotiators reach compromises with the union on these topics, draft 
actual contract language, and, on permissive topics, decide whether to 
bargain at all—all with varying levels of oversight by the school 
board. 
To be sure, the legislature always holds the final power to approve 
or reject tentative teacher contracts. That power can act as a critical 
check against countermajoritarian outcomes, and legislative 
consideration can also provide an avenue for public debate. However, 
the legislature’s final approval power is not the same as specific 
oversight of negotiations. That is especially true because agreements 
are presented to the legislature as comprehensive packages covering a 
wide range of policy, which the legislature can only approve or reject, 
not amend or consider in parts. And there are significant costs to 
rejecting a labor agreement: The union and the district leader must 
return to the bargaining table, which takes time and may prevent 
district administrators from fulfilling other duties, while the district 
continues to operate under the prior agreement. Consequently, 
legislators may approve agreements even when they feel that some 
particular terms do not align with preferences of the public.165 
Moreover, legislators are less publicly accountable in their role 
overseeing the bargaining process than they are outside of bargaining. 
This Article has argued that bargaining is not less transparent than 
alternative policymaking systems as a general matter, suggesting that 
lack of transparency cannot justify bargaining prohibitions.166 But 
there is a specific kind of transparency that seems particularly lacking 
in bargaining: public understanding of the bargaining process itself 
and of the rules governing the process. While the public understands 
that legislators are responsible for legislation, when policy made 
                                                 
163 These examples were drawn from policy enacted by the Houston Board of 
Education. Texas does not permit school districts to bargain collectively with teachers. 
164 See discussion supra note 5. 
165 A similar situation occurs when the President must choose whether to veto an 
omnibus budget bill. Scholars have observed that the President faces significant incentives 
to approve such bills even when they contain terms with which the President vehemently 
disagrees. See Antony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal 
Balance of Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 478–79 (1994). Legislators may be 
particularly disposed to overlook terms that have low political salience even if those terms 
are deeply important to school policy. For example, before teacher seniority became the 
rallying point for reformers that it is today, a legislator would have little political incentive 
to hold up a finalized collective bargaining agreement over concerns related to seniority. 
166 See supra Part II.C. 
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through bargaining is unpopular, government officials can claim that 
they were simply forced to accede to union demands.167 That claim 
would be inconsistent with the argument in Part II that bargaining 
does not give unions power to force their preferences on the public or 
even, in nearly all cases, to veto proposals by the government. Indeed, 
when topics are classified as permissive, the government need not 
bargain on them at all, and legislators always have final power to veto 
any agreement. Most members of the public, however, may be 
unaware of these realities. Consequently, government negotiators face 
diminished accountability for unpopular policies made through 
bargaining.168 For this reason, and the others described above, 
legislators may perform poorly as agents of the public in overseeing 
bargaining. 
B. Government Negotiators 
In the absence of effective legislative oversight, there are several 
reasons to be concerned that government negotiators may pursue 
public preferences less vigorously and less effectively than they or 
other officials would outside of bargaining. First, scholars have 
argued persuasively that top school district officials tend to be highly 
averse to conflict and legal risk, a tendency that may diminish their 
ability to use bargaining as a tool for reform. Frederick Hess and 
Lance Fusarelli note that the typical career path of district leaders 
leads them to value collaboration and consensus.169 District leaders 
                                                 
167 For example, according to a 2010 survey, thirty-eight percent of school board 
members claimed that collective bargaining agreements were a “total barrier” or “strong 
barrier” to the district’s ability to improve student achievement. HESS & MEEKS, supra 
note 163, at 48. Another twenty-five percent said teacher contracts were a “moderate 
barrier.” Id. 
168 For an instructive analogy, consider school finance lawsuits in which plaintiffs have 
claimed that state systems for funding schools violate federal or state constitutions. See 
generally Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Bonner v. 
Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009). In such litigation, local and state officials are 
tasked with defending the government’s current system of school funding. But education 
officials often sympathize with the notion that schools should be better funded. 
Consequently, school officials may be less than zealous in defending the suits, as the 
adversarial nature of litigation serves as a cover for a kind of “collusion” between 
government officials and plaintiffs who share the goal of securing a greater share of 
government resources for education. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, 
SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-
ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 140–43 (2009). 
169 Frederick M. Hess & Lance D. Fusarelli, School Superintendents and the Law: 
Cages of Their Own Design?, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE 
ROSENTHAL 4/4/2013  8:27 AM 
2013] Public Sector Collective Bargaining, Majoritarianism, and-Reform 711 
are particularly wary of legal risk. In one survey, forty-seven percent 
of district leaders said that they perceived and were affected by the 
“constant threat of litigation.”170 Legal trainings for superintendents 
focus on avoiding liability,171 and school districts often have limited 
resources to defend against lawsuits.172 Furthermore, government 
officials may perceive heightened legal risk when their actions are 
regulated by state collective bargaining law. As compared to the 
legislative process, bargaining carries greater legal obligations, 
including the somewhat amorphous duty to bargain in good faith. 
Teacher unions and their attorneys are unlikely to show restraint in 
threatening charges of bargaining violations, particularly when 
government negotiators employ aggressive tactics.173 
Second, aside from legal risk, government negotiators may have 
other reasons for avoiding aggressive tactics in bargaining with 
teacher unions. Note that the government’s side of the bargaining 
table is often staffed by school administrators who work closely with 
teachers, who are themselves former teachers and union members, 
and who likely understand that teachers are the district’s most 
important employees.174 In these circumstances, government 
negotiators’ hesitation to use aggressive bargaining tactics would be 
understandable. 
However, to effectively pursue public preferences, government 
negotiators likely need access to a full toolbox of bargaining 
strategies. In particular, consistent with the arguments described in 
Part II of this Article, government negotiators should be willing to use 
their power to cease negotiations on permissive topics when the 
parties appear unlikely to reach a mutually agreeable resolution on 
those topics. Perhaps more importantly, even when the government 
does not use this power, the prospect of such action, if credible, may 
                                                                                                         
JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 49, 49 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West 
eds., 2009). 
170 Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
171 Id. at 54. 
172 Id. at 54–55. 
173 For examples of such cases brought by public sector unions in recent years, see 
Board of Education v. Sered, 850 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Bon Homme Cnty. 
Comm’n v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., 699 N.W.2d 441 (S.D. 2005); 
Educ. Minn.-Greenway Local 1330 v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 673 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
174 In a survey of nearly 2,000 superintendents, ninety-nine percent of respondents had 
worked as a teacher. Over three-quarters had worked as a teacher for more than five years. 
THEODORE J. KOWALSKI ET AL., THE AMERICAN SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT: 2010 
DECENNIAL STUDY 33 (2011). 
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help compel agreements. In light of these realities, scholars have 
cautioned that administrators may be poorly suited to bargaining 
because “[g]ood adversarial bargaining often requires an aggressive, 
argumentative posture and can lead to open confrontation.”175 If 
government negotiators are unwilling to assume that posture, even 
when union proposals are inconsistent with public preferences, 
collective bargaining may lead to countermajoritarian results. 
IV 
A NEW POLICY APPROACH: BROAD PERMISSIVE BARGAINING WITH 
HEIGHTENED LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT 
This Article has argued that the structure of the bargaining process 
does not inherently give disproportionate power to unions but that 
public officials might nevertheless act as poor agents of the public in 
bargaining. While bargaining prohibitions are indiscriminate and 
likely unhelpful in ensuring majoritarianism, more targeted measures 
can help address the specific problems laid out in Part III. First, states 
should adopt a broad scope of bargaining in which many topics are 
mandatory for bargaining, many other topics are permissive, and few 
topics are prohibited.176 This Article does not attempt to defend a 
specific rule for separating topics into the mandatory and permissive 
categories, but the traditional Wagner Act balancing test, as described 
above, provides a promising framework.177 
Second, local legislatures should play a more active and public role 
in bargaining—and especially in the choice of whether to bargain on a 
permissive topic. The legislature’s decisions on that issue should be 
issued publicly, through formal votes. There are a variety of ways that 
states can structure the process in order to facilitate this result. States 
could first require that local legislatures receive detailed and regular 
updates on bargaining, perhaps received by a committee charged with 
reporting to the wider legislative body when needed.178 With respect 
                                                 
175 BERNADETTE MARCZELY & DAVID W. MARCZELY, HUMAN RESOURCE AND 
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 41 (2002). 
176 Of course, the lack of prohibited topics does not mean that there are no limits on 
bargaining. For example, local school districts and unions cannot agree to terms that are 
inconsistent with substantive provisions of state law. If state law provides that schools 
must be in session for at least 180 days, the school district and union cannot agree to a 
178-day school year. 
177 That test has already been adopted by several states for public sector bargaining. See 
supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
178 State law could go further and require a legislator to serve on the negotiating team 
and attend bargaining sessions as frequently as possible. 
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to permissive topics, the local legislature should be explicitly 
empowered by state law to enact binding resolutions that instruct 
government negotiators to either bargain on a permissive topic or pull 
such a topic off the table. Indeed, such votes should be required at the 
outset of bargaining for significant permissive topics. To further 
encourage active legislative oversight, the legislature could be 
required to take periodic votes on whether to continue bargaining on 
permissive topics. For example, such votes could be required every 
three months during bargaining. 
A system along these lines would facilitate majoritarianism in 
bargaining without resorting to prohibitions on bargaining. If the 
government negotiator fails to halt bargaining when it threatens to 
lead to a countermajoritarian result, the local legislature could 
override that decision. And perhaps more importantly, the legislature 
would be accountable for the failure to take such action. Although this 
approach does not guarantee that education policy will be consistent 
with public preferences, it substantially decreases the likelihood that 
bargaining outcomes will be less majoritarian than would be policy 
set in the absence of bargaining. That is because heightened 
involvement by legislators means that bargaining will be overseen by 
the same officials who are chiefly responsible for policymaking 
outside of bargaining. Furthermore, as the Article argues below, 
policy created under this proposal may in fact be more majoritarian 
than policy made in systems in which some topics are prohibited for 
bargaining. Thus, the proposed approach protects public preferences 
while allowing school districts and teachers the space needed to reach 
compromises that serve the interests of both parties. 
The remainder of this Part provides further support for the 
proposal. First, this Part shows that a broad scope of bargaining can 
do more to advance public preferences than a narrow scope of 
bargaining. Second, this Part shows that the proposal is more likely to 
affect public policy than prohibitions on bargaining because 
prohibitions are commonly ignored. Finally, this Part responds to 
additional objections to the proposal. 
A. Bargaining as Tool for Majoritarianism 
The proposal described above is more likely to advance public 
preferences than rules that prohibit topics for bargaining. The 
foundation of the argument is simple: A broad scope of bargaining 
ROSENTHAL 4/4/2013  8:27 AM 
714 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 673 
allows the parties wide latitude to make mutually beneficial trades.179 
With many topics potentially on the table, the government and the 
union have many options for compromises that give teachers terms 
that are important to them in exchange for terms that, in the 
government’s estimation, are important to the public.180 
To see this effect at work, first assume that the government and the 
union negotiate only over a narrow set of topics classified as 
mandatory for bargaining. If the public and teachers do not have 
identical preferences with respect to those topics, then negotiation 
will lead to some compromise package that is not absolutely ideal 
from either side’s perspective. But when an additional topic is added 
to the negotiations, the initial package can be shifted in the direction 
of one side’s preferences in exchange for an agreement on the new 
topic that favors the other side’s preferences. And this trade may, in 
fact, increase the overall satisfaction of both sides. Perhaps teachers 
are willing to sacrifice $2,000 in annual average salary for a 
modification to the tenure system that would allow teachers to get 
tenure after one year rather than two. Perhaps the public derives more 
utility from the decreased salary than it loses from shortening the 
probationary period. Then, the change is mutually beneficial—and it 
would not be available if tenure were a prohibited topic of bargaining. 
If the government negotiator has an information advantage over the 
union regarding the government’s plans, then the bargaining may give 
government officials a particularly strong tool to advance public 
preferences. Suppose, for instance, that the government already 
intends to implement a policy acceptable to the union on a permissive 
topic outside of bargaining, but the union is not aware of this. Then, 
by including the topic in bargaining, the government can obtain 
concessions from the union in exchange for a promise to do what it 
                                                 
179 It is axiomatic that in a “perfect market,” contracts promote social welfare because 
parties only agree to bargains that make them better off. See Richard Craswell, Freedom of 
Contract, COASE LECTURE SERIES (1994), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files 
/files/33.Craswell.FrdmCntrct.pdf. According to commentary accompanying the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, “[t]he enforcement of bargains rests in part on the common 
belief that enforcement enhances [social] utility” by encouraging contracts. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. b (1981). Although the market for teacher labor 
negotiations is surely far from perfect, there is little reason to believe that unions and 
school districts act against their interests in bargaining over permissive terms, leaving 
aside agency problems as discussed in Part III of this Article, a distinct issue. 
180 Cf. Malin, supra note 18, at 1393 (arguing that a broad scope of bargaining benefits 
the public because “the union can be transformed from an impediment to effective 
government into a contributor”). 
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already intended to do. When a state decides to make topics illegal 
rather than permissive, it foregoes this possibility. 
One might protest, however, that from the perspective of 
maximizing public utility, a state is just as well off prohibiting a topic 
of bargaining rather than allowing it to be traded against other topics. 
After all, if a topic is prohibited, then the government is free to 
implement whatever policy it likes, so the government can establish 
the public’s most favored policy without any need for a trade. In fact, 
this claim is incorrect in any bargaining system in which at least one 
topic is mandatory for bargaining. In such systems, bargaining over 
permissive topics may be the best way for the government to secure 
favorable terms on the mandatory topic. 
For instance, to return to the example above, imagine that in 
negotiations over salary and tenure, the optimal outcome from the 
public’s perspective is for the average salary to be $58,000 and for 
teachers to have a two-year probationary period before gaining tenure. 
In addition, imagine that if the parties negotiate over salary but not 
tenure, the bargaining power of the parties is such that salaries will be 
$60,000; since tenure is not bargained, the government is free to 
implement the two-year probationary period preferred by the public. 
But, in a negotiation over both topics, the union may decide to trade a 
salary decrease to $58,000 for reduction of the probationary period to 
just one year. This latter package may well be preferable to the 
majority of citizens, depending on the relative intensity of the public’s 
preference on salary and tenure.181 If tenure is not available for 
bargaining, the government may have no leverage to induce the union 
to forego the $2000 in salary. 
Indeed, when the government acts as an effective agent of the 
public, there is a strong upside to broad permissive bargaining and 
little downside. On permissive topics, the government can choose 
whether to make the topic available for a trade. If no mutually 
beneficial trade is available, the government can simply refuse to 
bargain over the topic and therefore leave the topic to be decided by 
the legislature or the administrative process.182 Technically, for topics 
classified as permissive, this agenda-setting power is shared by both 
the union and the government, since either side can refuse to bargain 
over the topic. In reality, though, a permissive designation gives 
                                                 
181 This will be the case, for example, if the public gains one unit of utility for every 
decrease of $500 in annual salary and loses three units for every one-year reduction in the 
probationary period. 
182 See discussion supra note 116. 
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meaningful discretion to the government but not to the union. Unions 
will nearly always prefer to bargain over permissive education policy 
topics because, for most topics of bargaining, the government has the 
ability to unilaterally determine policy on topics not addressed 
through a collective bargaining agreement. 
Thus, if opportunities for mutually beneficial trades on permissive 
topics are present in even a fraction of negotiations over teacher 
contracts, then prohibited topics in bargaining may be 
counterproductive from the standpoint of public utility. The existence 
of such opportunities is not merely hypothetical. For instance, the 
latest teacher contract in Washington, D.C., noted as groundbreaking 
by many observers, was commonly understood as a trade in which the 
school district increased teacher salary in exchange for the relaxation 
of terms on job security.183 The trade was only possible because both 
topics were available for bargaining. 
Admittedly, the government and union can engage in some forms 
of trading even on topics that are prohibited for bargaining. First, 
unions and districts could simply ignore the prohibited designation. 
As discussed in Section B below, that is a real possibility. But 
bargaining prohibitions cannot persuasively be defended on the 
grounds that they will often be ignored, particularly when an 
alternative approach—a broad permissive scope of bargaining—can 
be just as effective without the need for disregard of the law. Second, 
districts and unions could make tacit or non-binding agreements in 
which, in exchange for a particular contract term, the government 
would promise to implement a policy proposal through the ordinary 
legislative or administrative process.184 Such agreements, though, 
would be fraught with uncertainty due to their legal unenforceability 
and the need to secure separate approval through the legislature or 
other government institution. It would be more efficient to allow the 
                                                 
183 The agreement raised teacher salaries by twenty percent while allowing the district 
to dismiss teachers that were rated “ineffective” by an evaluation system designed by the 
district. See Sam Dillon, A Tentative Contract Deal for Washington Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2010, A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/education/08schools 
.html. 
184 For example, before states began to authorize bargaining, municipalities and unions 
often negotiated non-binding memoranda of understanding. See SLATER, supra note 23, at 
165. Even today, in states that ban bargaining for public employees, it is common for 
districts and unions to engage in “meet and confer” sessions that, according to one national 
union official, produce policies that “are treated by districts officials as if they were legally 
binding.” HESS & WEST, supra note 5, at 17. 
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parties to come to fully binding and self-executing agreements, a 
result achievable with a broad permissive scope of bargaining. 
B. The Efficacy of Prohibiting Topics for Bargaining 
There is a second reason to prefer classifying topics as permissive 
rather than prohibited. Bargaining critics argue that prohibitions are 
needed to shift power away from government negotiators and to other 
policymaking institutions such as the local legislature. In practice, 
though, government negotiators and unions often continue to bargain 
over prohibited topics. And legislators commonly allow this practice, 
approving the resulting labor agreements rather than taking more 
direct control over education policy. In these circumstances, 
bargaining prohibitions have not achieved their goals, while all 
stakeholders are burdened with the uncertainty arising from the 
unenforceability of contract terms. 
When teacher contracts include terms on topics prohibited for 
bargaining, one might infer that legislators have adopted one of two 
stances. First, legislators might have actively considered the tentative 
labor agreement, noted that it contained such terms, but approved the 
agreement because they were satisfied with those terms or with the 
agreement as a whole. In this scenario, legislators have treated 
prohibited topics as if they were merely permissive—available for 
bargaining if helpful to a positive outcome. Second, legislators might 
have simply yielded control on prohibited topics to government 
negotiators because they were either unaware of the prohibition or 
uninterested in removing the topics from bargaining. In both cases, 
bargaining prohibitions have failed to achieve their desired effect. 
To understand the phenomenon of bargaining over prohibited 
topics, it is helpful to first take a closer look at the legal consequences 
of bargaining prohibitions. First, when a topic is classified as 
prohibited, neither the district nor the union may insist that its 
counterpart bargain on the term. But that is also true for permissive 
topics. A second legal consequence is that contract terms on 
prohibited terms cannot be enforced in court. Thus, if class size is 
prohibited for bargaining, and a school district and union reach an 
agreement on the topic, then the school district would be free to 
breach the agreement without facing legal repercussions. Besides 
freeing public officials to implement their chosen policy regardless of 
what they have previously agreed to, the mechanism of non-
enforceability is thought to deter the negotiation of illegal contract 
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terms, since a party is unlikely to trade concessions for a promise that 
the other side is able to breach at any time.185 
It is also important to note that other possible legal consequences 
that have not historically been associated with bargaining 
prohibitions. For example, state laws do not explicitly provide for a 
private cause of action to enforce bargaining prohibitions. Indeed, in a 
recent case, the Michigan Circuit Court of the County of Kent ruled 
that there was no private right of action to enforce that state’s 
bargaining prohibitions.186 Similarly, state laws do not explicitly 
empower the state government to identify or remedy local violations 
of the scope of bargaining.187 
Consequently, bargaining prohibitions only have effect to the 
extent that school districts either (1) refuse to bargain over prohibited 
topics or (2) bargain over the topics but then choose to breach the 
resulting agreements. But the first move is available even for 
permissive topics, and the second comes with significant cost. 
Regardless of the legal status of a collective bargaining agreement, 
government officials who violate public commitments are likely to 
face political and reputational consequences. Officials are particularly 
unlikely to disregard agreements with unions because the parties 
frequently interact, making mutual trust valuable to both sides, even 
when they disagree.188 Since districts will usually follow illegal 
                                                 
185 The full deterrence model goes something like this: Suppose that Adam promises to 
do X and, in exchange, Brian promises to do Y. Suppose further that the agreement is 
unenforceable in court. To fulfill the agreement, either Adam or Brian has to act first; the 
identity of the first actor is likely specified in the agreement or understood by the parties. 
But with no legal recourse to enforce the contract, whoever acts first bears the risk that the 
other party will not perform. Thus, he will not perform or will demand a premium based 
on the risk of non-compliance by the other party. If he does not perform, then the time 
spent and expense incurred negotiating the agreement will be wasted. If he demands a 
premium, the parties may be unable to come to an agreement. 
186 Jurrians v. Kent Intermediate Sch. Bd., No. 10-12758-CL, at 8–10 (Mich. Circuit Ct. 
Cnty. of Kent Mar. 1, 2011). Taxpayers identified in a local teacher contract an obvious 
violation of Michigan’s prohibition on bargaining over the privatization of educational 
services. Id. at 2. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the suit, finding that state labor laws 
did not confer standing to private citizens to enforce bargaining limitations. Id. at 8–10. 
The author is not aware of any other cases on this topic. 
187 This article does not discuss whether states should employ stronger systems to 
enforce the scope of bargaining or whether such systems might be helpful from a 
majoritarian perspective. It is worth noting, however, that such systems would face several 
challenges, including the possibility that bargaining on prohibited topics would simply be 
replaced by non-binding “meet and confer” negotiations that would function no differently 
than binding bargaining. See supra note 184. 
188 For example, economists Ricard Gil and Justin Marion have shown that contractors 
and subcontractors who interact frequently are more likely to exhibit behavior suggesting 
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terms, there is little to deter the parties from negotiating those 
terms.189 
An examination of actual teacher contracts confirms that school 
districts and unions often bargain over illegal contract terms. The 
examples included here are drawn from four states with long-standing 
and clearly-defined categories of prohibited topics: New Jersey, 
Kansas, Michigan, and Delaware. First, three of these states prohibit 
bargaining over school scheduling. In New Jersey190 and Kansas,191 
school districts and unions are barred from bargaining on the length 
of the school day and school year, topics that many education 
reformers see as critical to improving public schools. In Michigan, 
there is a related but narrower prohibition on bargaining over the 
starting day of the school year.192 In all three states, school districts 
and unions have violated these prohibitions. For instance, the Newark, 
New Jersey school district and union have agreed to contract 
                                                                                                         
that the parties have relied on “self-enforcing contracts”—agreements or understandings 
that are not legally binding. RICARD GIL & JUSTIN MARION, THE ROLE OF REPEATED 
INTERACTIONS, SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS AND RELATIONAL [SUB]CONTRACTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS 20 (2009). 
189 For a discussion of the prevalence of such terms in private contracting, see generally 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1127 (2009). 
190 See Bd. of Educ. v. Woodstown-Pilesgrove Reg’l Educ. Ass’n, 410 A.2d 1131, 
1136 (N.J. 1982) (holding that “the school calendar and the number of hours of 
employment on a particular school day” are “non-negotiable managerial decision[s],” 
which bear “too substantially upon too many and important non-teacher interests to be 
settled by collective bargaining or binding arbitration”); Piscataway Twp. Educ. Ass’n v. 
Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 704 A.2d 981, 985 (N.J. 1998) (holding that a school 
district “did not have to negotiate with the Association before deciding to open schools on 
days previously scheduled as recess days”). The New Jersey chapter of the National 
Education Association has itself acknowledged that the “[a]cademic calendar” and 
“[d]esign of students’ school day” are illegal for bargaining in New Jersey. NEW JERSEY 
EDUC. ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING MANUAL 7 (2009), available at http://tinyurl 
.com/NJNEAmanual. 
191 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413(l)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) 
(mandating that districts and unions cannot negotiate over “[m]atters which relate to the 
duration of the school term, and specifically to . . . the development and adoption of a 
policy to provide for a school term consisting of school hours”). In a more general 
statement of public labor policy, Kansas code also declares, “the difference between public 
and private employment is further reflected in the constraints that bar any abdication or 
bargaining away by public employers of their continuing legislative discretion.” § 75-
4321(a)(5) (Westlaw). 
192 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215(3)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.) (“Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining 
representative of its employees shall not include . . . [e]stablishment of the starting day for 
the school year. . . .”). 
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provisions that set the exact daily schedule for students.193 The 
Newark agreement further requires that “[t]here shall be scheduled no 
more than 185 pupil days.”194 It also discusses specifics of the yearly 
calendar, including spring break.195 And it requires that any 
“variations in schedule shall be negotiated between the Newark 
Public Schools and the Union.”196 Other districts in New Jersey have 
negotiated similar agreements.197 
Meanwhile, in Kansas City, Kansas, the teacher contract includes a 
specific yearly calendar setting the first day of student instruction, 
school holidays, and academic quarters.198 In Wichita, the collective 
bargaining agreement requires the district to clear nearly 
insurmountable hurdles to extend the school year.199 And in violation 
of Michigan law, teacher contracts in several districts in Michigan 
specify school calendars.200 
It is also common for collective bargaining agreements to govern 
staff deployment. Schools often use seniority as the sole factor in 
                                                 
193 Under the agreement, elementary students in Newark must arrive at 8:25 a.m. and 
be dismissed at 2:55 p.m., while high schools are in session from 8:20 p.m. to 2:40 p.m.. 
ST. OPERATED SCH. DIST. OF NEWARK & NEWARK TEACHERS UNION, 2009–2010 
AGREEMENT, at 19, 21, available at http://tinyurl.com/newarkcontract2009 [hereinafter 
“Newark contract”]. 
194 Id. at 16. 
195 Id. at 17. 
196 Id. at 22. 
197 For a similar agreement in Trenton, see TRENTON BD. OF EDUC. & TRENTON EDUC. 
ASS’N, 2004–2009 AGREEMENT, available at http://tinyurl.com/trentoncontract2004. 
Provision XII(B)(2) sets the teacher day at six hours and forty-five minutes, while 
provision XII(B)(4) requires that the student school day be at least fifteen minutes shorter. 
The Woodbridge teacher contract does not set a student schedule but requires that high 
school teachers be on the job from 7:40 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP BD. 
OF EDUC. & WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP EDUC. ASS’N 2009–2012 AGREEMENT, Art. II(B), 
available at http:// tinyurl.com/woodbridgecontract2009. 
198 BD. OF EDUC., UNIFIED SCH. DIST. NO. 500 & THE NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N OF KANSAS 
CITY, KAN., 2009–2011 AGREEMENT, Exhibits A–D, available at http://tinyurl.com 
/kansascitycontract2009 [hereinafter “KANSAS CITY CONTRACT”]. 
199 To do so, the district would have to first secure the agreement of the union 
president, then win the support of eighty percent of the affected staff in a secret ballot 
referendum. BD. OF EDUC., UNIFED SCH. DIST. NO. 259 & UNITED TCHRS. OF WICHITA, 
2009–2011 AGREEMENT, at 10–11, available at http://tinyurl.com/wichitacontract2009 
[hereinafter “WICHITA CONTRACT”]. 
200 DEARBORN BD. OF EDUC. & THE DEARBORN FED’N OF TCHRS, 2007–2009 
AGREEMENT, at 42–43, available at http://tinyurl.com/dearborncontract2007; SAGINAME 
EDUC. ASS’N & THE BD. OF EDUC. OF THE SAGINAW SCH. DIST., 2006–2008 COMPACT OF 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATORS, at 25. Exhibit A.2, available at http://tinyurl.com/saginaw 
contract2006; BD. OF EDUC.  OF THE SCH. DIST. OF THE CITY OF PONTIAC & THE PONTIAC 
EDUC. ASS’N, 2004–2007 MASTER AGREEMENT, at 36–44, available at http://tinyurl.com 
/pontiaccontract2004. 
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decisions related to assignments, transfers, and layoffs, a policy that 
education reformers frequently attack.201 In Delaware, however, staff 
deployment is prohibited for bargaining.202 Disregarding that 
prohibition, the Wilmington school district and union have agreed on 
terms strikingly similar to the “mechanical seniority system” 
previously held illegal by the Delaware Supreme Court.203 Other 
districts in Delaware have agreed to similar provisions.204 Finally, the 
Wilmington contract also sets terms on student discipline, which is a 
prohibited topic under Delaware law.205 
C. Objections: Too Much Bargaining, Too Much Oversight 
The proposal described here may lead to several additional 
objections. First, one might worry that the local legislature will be too 
hesitant to cease bargaining on topics, even when it appears that those 
topics cannot be resolved consistent with public preferences. To 
critics, the most likely culprit for such hesitance would be the political 
influence of teacher unions.206 Yet, as noted above, advocates of 
bargaining prohibitions cannot support their arguments based on 
union political influence because the same allegedly captured 
legislators would set policy outside of bargaining.207 Critics also fear 
                                                 
201 See Klein & Rhee, supra note 9 (calling on states to end seniority-based “last in first 
out” layoff systems). 
202 The seminal case is Colonial Sch. Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, NCCEA/DSEA/NEA, 449 
A.2d 243 (Del. 1982). There, the Delaware Supreme Court held illegal a union proposal to 
utilize a strict seniority system in assigning, transferring, or terminating teachers because it 
would have “limit[ed] the Board’s authority to exercise discretion in the deployment of its 
professional staff.” Id. at 245. Though Delaware’s education bargaining statute has been 
amended since Colonial Affiliate, the court relied on statutory language that has remained 
in place. Compare id. at 246–47, with 14 Del. Code Ann. § 4002(t) (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 legislation). 
203 Compare Colonial Affiliate, 449 A.2d at 245, with WILMINGTON CONTRACT, supra 
note 197, at 33, 37–40. 
204 See INDIAN RIVER EDUC. ASS’N & INDIAN RIVER BD. OF EDUC., 2008–2011 
CONTRACT, at 10–12, available at http://tinyurl.com/indianrivercontract2008 (tying 
involuntary and voluntary transfer decisions to seniority); BD. OF EDUC., CAESAR RODNEY 
SCH. DIST. & CAESAR RODNEY EDUC. ASS’N, 2007–2010 AGREEMENT, at 18–19, 
available at http://tinyurl.com/ceasarrodneycontract2007 (tying involuntary transfer 
decisions to seniority). 
205 The agreement establishes a joint committee of the union and district to settle 
questions of student discipline and guarantees teachers the right to exclude a student from 
class until action has been taken pursuant to a Student Code. WILMINGTON CONTRACT, 
supra note 197, at 18, 65. The Delaware Supreme Court held similar terms illegal. 
Colonial Affilliate, 449 A.2d at 244–45. 
206 See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
207 Id. 
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that unions would pressure the government to bargain through other 
means: If the government ceased negotiations on a permissive topic, 
the union could perhaps retaliate by refusing to agree to terms on 
other topics or even by threatening to strike.208 If the union took such 
action, however, it would violate the scope of bargaining rules and 
could be enjoined to bargain in good faith.209 
Second, one might also object that the proposal will lead to 
excessive oversight and politicization, thereby making bargaining less 
productive. From this perspective, negotiations are best conducted in 
secret and away from the influence of politics. Moreover, one might 
claim that the proposed system amounts to one in which every 
tentative agreement on every individual topic must be approved by 
the legislature before negotiations can continue. After all, if the 
legislature learns of a tentative agreement on a particular topic and 
dislikes the agreement, the legislature can instruct the negotiator to 
pull the topic from the table. If the legislature uses this power 
actively, then bargaining may be plodding and full of false starts (and 
false finishes). 
However, the danger of excessive politicization is likely minimal. 
For one thing, some states already require extensive transparency, 
including publication of bargaining proposals, and there is no 
indication that these requirements cause bargaining to become 
unproductive.210 Moreover, the system might include confidentiality 
requirements that prevent legislators from describing certain aspects 
of negotiations to the public.211 Finally, to the extent that the system 
                                                 
208 See, e.g., Application of the Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy to the Duty to 
Bargain and Unilateral Action: A Review and Reevaluation, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
918, 943–44 (1974) (suggesting that a union can “subtly convey” that the union will refuse 
to approve an agreement that does not contain a satisfactory term on a permissive topic). 
209 Admittedly, the enforcement of the rules barring such action will not always be 
simple. Though beyond the scope of this Article, that issue deserves further study. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the claim that parties disregard the rules governing permissive 
topics, a small body of empirical research indicates that the designation of topics as 
permissive has a distinct impact on bargaining outcomes. See John Thomas Delaney & 
Donna Sockell, The Mandatory-Permissive Distinction and Collective Bargaining 
Outcomes, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 566, 576 (1989); Stephen A. Woodbury, The 
Scope of Bargaining and Bargaining Outcomes in the Public Schools, 38 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 195, 205 (1985). 
210 See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
211 For example, federal law provides that the executive branch must provide certain 
information on covert military operations to the intelligence committees of the House and 
Senate. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b) (2006). The President may decide to allow information to be 
released only to a smaller group of key legislators. 50 U.S.C. § 513b(c)(2). Thus, 
information is protected from public disclosure. 
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makes bargaining slightly more political, that may be a feature rather 
than a bug, because it may help bring education policy closer to 
majority preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Although this Article has focused on the majoritarian implications 
of collective bargaining for public employees, other values should be 
considered in analyzing bargaining.212 For example, supporters of 
public sector bargaining have argued that the ordinary democratic 
processes for determining policy allows the majority to set terms and 
conditions of public employment that are neither fair to employees 
nor in the best interest of the community. As explained by Charles 
Cogen, a former president of the American Federation of Teachers, 
“[b]oards of education, whether well-meaning or not, decide upon 
salaries, working conditions, and curricula . . . on what is expedient, 
economic and politic.”213 Cogen went on: “[B]ecause taxpayers are 
not always generous, politicians civic-minded, nor board of education 
members magnanimous, our classes are overcrowded, textbooks 
scarce, clerical work mountainous, salaries low, and morale 
lower.”214 From this perspective, bargaining is a helpful correction to 
an otherwise flawed majoritarian process for determining education 
policy. 
There are other reasons for robust public sector collective 
bargaining, even if it sometimes leads to policy that does not fit 
perfectly with the public’s preferences. Workers’ opportunity to 
bargain collectively is properly classified as a human right.215 
Through collective bargaining, workers gain a real voice in the places 
                                                 
212 Judicial review is the canonical example of a countermajoritarian institution in 
American government. For all of the scholarly discussion of the “countermajoritarian 
difficulty,” this aspect of judicial review is often celebrated. See Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal 
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (2004) (“When we think about 
judicial review, we tend to envision the Supreme Court as a ‘countermajoritarian hero,’ 
protector of minorities from tyrannical majority rule.”). 
213 Charles Cogen, President, Am. Fed’n of Tchrs, Collective Bargaining and the New 
Status of Education, Address to the Colorado Federation of Teachers 2 (Oct. 29, 1965) 
(transcript available from the Walter P. Reuther Library at https://reuther.wayne.edu 
/files/Cogen%2010.29.65.pdf). 
214 Id. 
215 The right to form and join trade unions is recognized by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations soon after its formation by a unanimous 
vote of its members, including the United States. G. A. Res. 217A (III) A(23)(4), U. N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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where they spend many if not most of their waking hours. Collective 
bargaining thus advances personal dignity and autonomy. Strong 
unions further prevent employers—public and private—from abusing 
the power that comes from control over workers’ livelihoods. 
But education is also a critical right for students,216 and school 
policy is a matter of deep public concern. This Article has tried to 
show that public dominion over education policy can coexist with 
robust collective bargaining. Indeed, reformers should support a broad 
scope of permissive bargaining as the best way to align education 
policy with public preferences. But education reformers should not 
expect any change to bargaining rules—including prohibitions on 
bargaining—to produce positive change in the absence of 
accompanying social and political movements. At their majoritarian 
apex, bargaining rules can ensure that the reformers have the same 
voice in bargaining as they do in the ordinary legislative and 
administrative process. Above all, those interested in improving our 
schools must persuasively explain their vision to fellow citizens and 
elected representatives.217 
 
                                                 
216 Forty-eight state constitutions contain a provision related to education. Gershon M. 
Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 
63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814 (1985). Some of these provisions merely require the state to 
provide a system of free public education. See id. at 815. But nearly half of state 
constitutions emphasize the need to provide quality education, and many contain even 
stronger language. See id. at 815–16. Under the Washington Constitution, for example, 
“[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all 
children residing within its borders.” WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
217 Education reformers are already embracing this ethos, with several reform-centered 
political advocacy organizations established in recent years. See generally Stephen 
Sawchuk, New Breed of Advocacy Groups Shakes up Education Field, EDUC. WEEK, May 
16, 2012, at 1. The most prominent example is StudentsFirst, which Michelle Rhee started 
after resigning as Chancellor of the D.C. Public Schools. Rhee’s organization aims “to 
build a national movement to defend the interest of children in public education and 
pursue transformative reform.” Our Mission, STUDENTSFIRST.ORG, http://www.students 
first.org/pages/our-mission (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
